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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of credit reporting on the repayment behav-
ior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loan
repayment is not third-party enforceable. We then compare market outcome
with a public credit registry to that without a credit registry. This exper-
iment is conducted for two market environments: ﬁrst, a market in which
repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is not feasible and, sec-
ond, a market in which borrowers and lenders can choose to trade repeatedly
with each other. In the market without repeat interaction the credit market
collapses without a credit registry, as lenders rightly fear that borrowers will
default. The introduction of a registry in this environment signiﬁcantly raises
repayment rates and the credit volume extended by lenders. When repeat
transactions are possible a credit registry is not necessary to sustain high
market performance as relationship banking enforces repayment even when
lenders cannot share information. In this environment credit reporting has
little impact on market eﬃciency, it does however aﬀect trading structure
and distribution. The presence of a credit registry leads to fewer banking
relationships and reduces the ability of lenders to extract rents from such
relationships.
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In credit markets, borrowers typically have more information about their investment
opportunities, their own character and their prior indebtedness than lenders. This
asymmetry of information gives rise to selection problems for lenders and potential
moral hazard of borrowers, which may lead to a rationing of credit (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). In many countries problems of asymmetric information are aggravated
by the fact that loan contracts are costly to enforce (Levine, 1998; Jappelli et al.,
2005).
One response to asymmetric information and costly enforcement in the credit
market is information sharing between lenders, i.e. credit reporting through private
credit bureaus or public credit registries. Theoretical models suggest that credit
reporting can reduce adverse selection in markets where borrowers approach diﬀer-
ent lenders sequentially (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Moreover, credit reporting
can also have a strong disciplining eﬀect on borrowers. Diamond (1989) shows that
a public credit registry can motivate borrowers to choose agreed projects. Further
models show that information sharing can discipline borrowers into exerting high
eﬀort in projects (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000) and repaying loans
(Klein, 1992).
A recent survey by the World Bank (World Bank, 2005) shows that credit bu-
reaus or credit registries now exist in over 100 countries worldwide. In the USA,
where credit reporting is most prevalent, over 3 million credit reports are issued
every day (Hunt, 2005). In recent years, many developing and transition economies
have also introduced credit registries or fostered credit bureaus in the hope of boost-
ing credit growth (Miller, 2003). Giving the strong growth of credit reporting
worldwide and the high hopes which policy makers place in such institutions, there
is a need for empirical evidence which examines how credit reporting aﬀects the
performance of the ﬁnancial sector.
In this paper we use experimental methods to examine how a public credit
registry aﬀects loan repayment and credit market performance. We examine an
experimental credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party enforceable.
We ﬁrst implement a market in which there is no opportunity for information shar-
ing between lenders. We then implement an identical market, but with a public
credit registry which collects and disburses credit information to lenders. By com-
paring repayment behavior and credit volumes between the two markets we can
identify the impact of a credit registry on credit market performance.
We contribute to the empirical literature on credit reporting in two ways. First,
1this is the only study we know of which examines the impact of information sharing
on borrower behavior. Several authors have shown that credit reports do reduce the
selection costs of lenders by allowing them to more accurately predict loan defaults
(Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Barron and Staaten, 2003; Powell et al., 2004). The
disciplining eﬀect of information sharing on borrower behavior has, however, not
yet been studied.1 This is by no means surprising, giving that with ﬁeld data it
is diﬃcult to identify whether an individual borrower has behaved diﬀerently than
he would have done without the presence of a credit registry. Indeed, if borrower
behavior were observable in the ﬁeld, it would be contractible so that there would
be no moral hazard on the account of asymmetric information.
The second contribution of our paper is that, in contrast to existing studies, we
can directly identify how the introduction of a credit registry aﬀects credit market
performance. Current evidence on the impact of information sharing on credit mar-
ket performance relies on cross-country comparisons. Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
and Djankov et al. (2005) show that aggregate bank credit to the private sector is
higher in countries where information sharing is more developed. Analyses of ﬁrm-
level survey data (Galindo and Miller, 2001; Love and Mylenko, 2003) further show
that access to bank credit is easier in countries where credit bureaus or registries
exist. However, given the cross-sectional nature of their data, these studies cannot
identify the direction of causality between credit reporting and credit volume. Af-
ter all, theory suggests that credit bureaus will emerge where lenders beneﬁt more
from them (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and this is certainly the case where the
credit volume is higher. Thus a positive correlation between credit reporting and
credit market performance may arise simply because credit bureaus are more likely
to be set up in countries where lending is vibrant. By applying experimental meth-
ods, our study allows us to circumvent this endogeneity issue and identify how the
exogenous introduction of a credit registry aﬀects credit market performance.
The impact of a credit registry on repayment behavior may depend strongly on
the nature of credit transactions. In particular, the extent to which lending rela-
tionships are feasible may aﬀect the beneﬁts of information sharing between lenders.
In a credit market dominated by short-term interaction (for example due to high
mobility of borrowers) borrowers cannot be disciplined to repay loans in the absence
of an information sharing mechanism. In contrast, in credit markets dominated by
repeated interactions (e.g. working capital loans), information sharing may not be
1Jappelli and Pagano (2002) show that loan defaults, measured by country risk indicators, are
lower in countries where credit registries and bureaus are more developed. However, this result
can obviously result from better selection of borrowers rather than from actually disciplining them
to repay.
2required to discipline borrowers. In such markets, theoretical models suggest that
self-enforcing implicit contracts between lenders and borrowers, (i.e. banking rela-
tionships), can motivate high eﬀort and timely repayments (Bull, 1987; Boot and
Thakor, 1994). Empirical studies conﬁrm that some credit market segments (in
particular small business lending) are pervaded by relationship-banking and that
these relationships improve the access of potential borrowers to credit (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994, Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). Experimental studies (Brown et al., 2004;
Fehr and Zehnder, 2005) also conﬁrm that long-term relationships are a powerful
disciplinary device.
In this paper we examine how the impact of a credit registry depends on the fea-
sibility of relationship banking. We conduct our experiment for two credit market
environments. In one environment information conditions prevent repeated inter-
action between particular borrowers and lenders so that all lending transactions
are inherently one-oﬀ. In the second environment, information conditions are such
that lenders can choose to trade with the same borrower repeatedly and banking
relationships can emerge endogenously.
Our results indicate that the impact of a credit registry on market performance is
highly dependent on the nature of credit transactions. When relationship banking is
not feasible the credit market essentially collapses in the absence of a credit registry.
As repayments are not third-party enforceable, many borrowers default and lenders
cannot proﬁtably oﬀer credit contracts. The introduction of a credit registry in this
environment greatly enhances the performance of the credit market. The availability
of information on past repayment behavior allows lenders to condition their oﬀers
on the borrowers’ reputation. As borrowers with a good track record get better
credit oﬀers, all borrowers have a strong incentive to sustain their reputation by
repaying their debt. As a consequence a well functioning credit market is established
in which a large percentage of the available gains from trade is realized.
When repeated interaction between borrowers and lenders is possible, the pres-
ence of a credit registry has no such eﬀect on market performance. In this environ-
ment, the market participants solve the moral hazard problem even in the absence
of a credit registry. By repeatedly interacting with the same borrower, lenders es-
tablish long-term relationships which enable them to condition their credit terms on
the past repayments of their incumbent borrower. As only a good reputation leads
to attractive credit oﬀers from the incumbent lender, borrowers have strong incen-
tives to repay. The disciplining eﬀect of these banking relationships is suﬃciently
strong so that the introduction of a credit registry only slightly improves credit mar-
ket performance. Nevertheless, even when relationship banking is feasible, a credit
3registry does aﬀect market outcome. First, the credit market is less dominated
by speciﬁc borrower-lender relations, as these are no longer necessary to enforce
repayment. Second, by improving the information available to “outside” lenders, a
credit registry reduces the ability of lenders to extract rents from relationships.
From the policy perspective, our results have two consequences for the design of
credit registries and credit bureaus. First, theory suggests that the optimal amount
of information to be shared between lenders depends on the potential disciplining
eﬀect of credit reporting, vis-a-vis its screening eﬀect. When the disciplining eﬀect
is negligible, it is optimal to share as much information as is available on borrowers.
In contrast, when the disciplining eﬀect is potentially important, it may be optimal
to limit the type of information shared (Padilla and Pagano, 2000) and the length
of credit histories (Vercammen, 1995). The intuition behind this result is that full
disclosure of information on borrowers allow lenders to identify the type of borrow-
ers and thus reduces adverse selection. However, full disclosure also eliminates any
incentives of “bad” borrowers to imitate the behavior of good borrowers in order to
hide their type. Our results suggest that a limiting of information exchange may
be optimal in markets where relationship banking is rare and the disciplining of
borrowers relies on credit reporting. Second, when the disciplining eﬀect of infor-
mation sharing is potentially strong, lenders should make sure that the existence
of credit bureaus and credit registries is well-known to borrowers. Rather than
share information secretly, as is the current practice in some countries (Luoto et
al., 1994), lenders should make sure that borrowers are aware that their repayment
behavior will be recorded and could aﬀect their future access to credit.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Part 2 presents our experimental design and
part 3 the corresponding predictions. Part 4 presents our results. Part 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Experimental studies have proven highly valuable in testing theoretical conjectures
which are diﬃcult to identify using ﬁeld data. In ﬁnancial markets experiments
have, for example, been used to study the emergence of bubbles (Smith et al., 1988;
Lei et al., 2001), the dissemination of information (Sunder, 1992), herd behavior
(Celan and Kariv, 2004), and more recently the emergence of banking relationships
(Fehr and Zehnder, 2005). Our objective is to study how the repayment behavior
of borrowers is aﬀected by information sharing among lenders. We therefore im-
plement an experimental credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party
enforceable.
4Our experimental credit market involves 17 participants. These participants
are randomly assigned to the role of a borrower or a lender at the beginning of a
session. Ten subjects are in the role of lenders and seven subjects are in the role of
borrowers. Each session lasts for 20 periods and roles of subjects are ﬁxed for the
whole session.
At the beginning of every period each lender is endowed with 50 capital units (¯ k).
A lender has two opportunities to make use of his endowment. He can either invest
the endowment in an endowment-storing technology or he can use the endowment
to extend credit to a borrower. The ﬁrst stage of each period is a continuous one-
sided auction, in which lenders and borrowers can seal credit contracts. The lenders
are the contract makers, i.e. they alone can make credit oﬀers to the borrowers,
who themselves can not apply for credit. When making a credit oﬀer the lender
has to specify four items: the size of the loan (k), the requested repayment (˜ r), the
set of market participants who can observe the oﬀer and ﬁnally, which borrowers
are authorized to accept the oﬀer. Lenders can freely decide how they want to split
their endowment between the endowment-storing technology and a credit oﬀer, i.e.
the loan size k can be picked from the set {5, 10, 15, ..., 50}. The set for the
requested repayment ˜ r is given by {5, 10, 15, ..., 100}. There are two types of
credit oﬀers: Public credit oﬀers and private credit oﬀers. A private credit oﬀer
is only addressed to one speciﬁc borrower. It cannot be seen or accepted by other
borrowers and is also not visible to other lenders. A public oﬀer is always shown
to all borrowers and all other lenders. However, even with public oﬀers the lender
must specify which borrowers are authorized to accept the oﬀer. Hereby the lender
can choose, or exclude as many borrowers as he wants.2 During the auction a lender
can make as many public and private oﬀers as he wants. However, each lender can
only conclude one credit contract per period. As soon as a borrower accepts an
oﬀer of a given lender a contract is concluded and all other outstanding oﬀers made
by this lender disappear from the market and can no longer be accepted by other
borrowers. Each borrower can accept at most one contract per period so that our
credit market implements an excess supply of credit.
Borrowers are endowed with 5 capital units in each period. At the second stage
of a period borrowers automatically earn an investment income which is twice the
size of this endowment and their borrowed capital, 2(5 + k). At the third stage
of a period, borrowers who received a loan decide whether they want to make the
repayment requested by the lender (r =˜ r)o rn o tr e p a ya ta l l( r = 0). Partial
2This implementation of public oﬀers is designed to capture public announcements of credit
conditions by banks who can always choose not to extend credit to some clients on these terms.
5repayments are not possible.3
At the end of each period, each lender is informed about his borrower’s re-
payment decision, proﬁts are calculated and all market participants get to know
their own and their partner’s payoﬀs for the period. Payoﬀ functions, the number
of lenders and borrowers and the number of trading periods are common knowl-
edge. The monetary payoﬀs of the market participants per period are calculated as
follows:
Payoﬀ of lender: π =5 0− k + r
Payoﬀ of borrower: v =2 ( 5+k) − r
Our goal is to study how the presence of a credit registry aﬀects borrowers’ repay-
ment choices and credit market performance. In order to do so we ﬁrst implement
our credit market without any opportunity for information sharing between lenders.
We then implement the credit market with a public credit registry which collects
and disburses credit information to lenders. In the treatments with a credit registry
all lenders get a credit report at the beginning of every period. The credit report is
free and lists, for each borrower and all past periods, whether the borrower received
a loan and whether he repaid it. The report thus contains complete information
on the past repayment behavior of all borrowers. However, information on loan
sizes and requested repayments is not provided. In these treatments all borrowers
and lenders are aware that the credit registry automatically collects and disburses
information on repayment behavior in each period. Table 1 provides an overview
of our experimental treatments. Treatments with a credit registry are called “CR”
treatments, while those without a credit registry are called “NO” treatments (for
no credit registry).
We expect that the impact of credit reporting on borrowers’ repayment behavior
may depend on the feasibility of an alternative disciplining mechanism in the credit
market: relationship banking. In reality, the feasibility of relationship banking in
a credit market varies, depending on how mobile borrowers are and how diverse
their funding needs are, compared to the product and geographical specialization of
lenders. If borrowers are highly mobile and lenders are geographically specialized,
banking relationships will be diﬃcult to maintain. On the other hand, if mobility
of borrowers is low or lenders are universal banks with country-wide coverage re-
lationships are simple to maintain. We examine the impact of credit reporting for
market conditions with varying feasibility of relationship banking. In order to study
3In reality some borrowers obviously become delinquent without fully defaulting. However due
to the deterministic nature of investment earnings in our design we exclude partial repayments.
6the range of the impact which a credit registry could have on borrower behavior we
implement our CR-NO comparison for two border cases: in one market condition
relations are not feasible at all, while in the other condition borrowers and lenders
can always continue relationships if they want to.
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Relationship Banking
Not Possible Possible





Our ﬁrst condition makes it impossible for lenders to interact repeatedly with
a particular borrower by randomly assigning identiﬁcation numbers (IDs) to bor-
rowers and lenders in each new period (henceforth treatments in this environment
are called R treatments). This procedure guarantees that no market participant
can identify his former trading partners at the beginning of a period and therefore
intentional repeated oﬀers by lenders to borrowers are ruled out.
Our second environment involves a market in which lenders and borrowers have
the opportunity to engage in long-term relationships. Repeated interaction with
the same trading partner is possible because subjects have ﬁxed IDs for the entire
experimental session (henceforth treatments in this environment are called F treat-
ments). Consequently, lenders can oﬀer credit to the same borrower (i.e., to the
same ID number) in consecutive periods and, if the borrower accepts these oﬀers,
a long-term relationship is established.
In total we conducted 20 experimental sessions, ﬁve for each of our four treat-
ments. We had 17 subjects in each session, which makes a total of 340 participants.
All experimental subjects were volunteers. They were all participating for the ﬁrst
time in such an experiment, and each participant could only participate in one ses-
sion (i.e., each subject experienced only one of the treatments). All participants
were students at the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of Technol-
ogy Zurich (ETH). The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted
7with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). A session lasted ap-
proximately ninety minutes. Subjects received a show-up fee of 10 Swiss francs
(CHF) and 1 additional franc for every 20 points earned during the experiment.
On average subjects earned 55 Swiss francs (1.3 CHF ≈ 1 US$ in January 2006).
To make sure that all participants fully understand the decision process and the
payment structure of the game, each subject had to read a detailed set of instruc-
tions before a session was started. After reading the instructions participants had
to pass a test with control questions. No session started before all subjects had cor-
rectly answered all control questions. Additionally there were two practice periods
before an actual session was started in order to make the participants familiar with
the bidding procedures. In both practice periods, subjects only went through the
oﬀering stage of a period, i.e. there were no repayment choices and subjects could
not earn money in the practice periods.
3 Predictions
Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and selﬁshness of all
market participants, the prediction for all four treatments is straightforward: Since
credit repayments are not enforceable, the borrowers’ best response in the stage
game is to never repay their debt. Lenders, anticipating this behavior, will never
oﬀer credit so that the credit market collapses in the stage game equilibrium. As
our experiment lasts for a ﬁnite number of periods, a simple backward induction
argument ensures that the stage game equilibrium is played in every period of the
game. The diﬀerent treatment conditions do not aﬀect this prediction. If lenders are
certain that all borrowers are selﬁsh, neither public information on past repayment
behavior of borrowers nor the possibility to establish long-term relationships can
overcome this ineﬃcient outcome.
However, empirical evidences suggests that not all people simply maximize mon-
etary payoﬀs. It has been shown that, in a wide range of economic settings, the
behavior of some people is also driven by social motives (for an overview see, e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt, 2002 and Camerer, 2003). Especially important for our purposes
is the experimental evidence on the “investment game” (also called “trust game”).
In this simple two-player experiment the ﬁrst mover (”investor”) gets an endow-
ment X, which he can keep or invest. If the investor invests i ≤ X, his investments
is trebled and transferred to the second mover (”trustee”). The trustee must then
decide how much to send back to the investor. A large number of studies show that
many investors decide to invest and a considerable fraction of trustees are willing
8to pay back a positive amount. It appears that many trustees feel a moral oblig-
ation to repay. Or, put diﬀerently, they are willing to reciprocate the investor’s
risky action which beneﬁts them (for an extensive summary see Camerer, 2003).
Recent research by Karlan (2005) shows, moreover, that the second mover behavior
in investment games can be used to predict real-life ﬁnancial decisions.
The evidence from the investment game suggests that, in our experiment social
motives could lead some borrowers to repay loans because they would otherwise
suﬀer from a bad conscience or because they would like to reciprocate “fair” ﬁ-
nancing conditions provided by lenders. In the following we therefore examine our
credit market treatments under the assumption that a fraction p of the borrowers
are “conditionally honest”. We assume that these borrowers are willing to meet
their repayment obligations (r =˜ r) on a voluntary basis, as long as the repayment
requested by the lender does not exceed a certain threshold value ˜ r(k) ≤ φk, where
φ>1 (this implies that an honest borrower is prepared to repay a loan which de-
mands some positive interest rate). Guided by existing experimental evidence (see
e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 2002), we assume that honest borrowers only repay if they
get at least an equal share of gains from trade, i.e. (2 − φ)k ≥ φk − k or φ ≤ 1.5.
These considerations lead us therefore to assume a parameter range of φ ∈ (1,1.5].
3.1 Predictions for the R Treatments
In the R-NO treatment, lenders have no information on the prior behavior of any
particular borrower in the market. This treatment essentially implements a series
of one-shot interactions so that each period can be analyzed as a one-period game.
In such a game, selﬁsh borrowers never repay their debt, while honest borrowers
repay as long as they are oﬀered a contract of the form [k,˜ r ≤ φk]. Consequently,
under these conditions the provision of credit can only be proﬁtable for lenders if the
fraction of honest borrowers p is large enough. In Proposition A1 in the Appendix
we formally show that lenders are only willing to extend credit if p ≥ 1
φ. If there
are fewer honest borrowers the credit market collapses and all lenders fully invest
their capital into the endowment-storing technology. In light of our parameter
assumptions, Proposition A1 suggests that a substantial share of honest borrowers
are required to guarantee the existence of a functioning credit market. If the honest
borrowers preferences are such that φ ∈ (1,1.5], then the necessary fraction of honest
borrowers to make credit oﬀers proﬁtable for lenders is p ≥ 2/3. Experimental
evidence suggests, however, that only 40 to 60 percent of subjects are motivated by
social preferences (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 2002). Accordingly, we would predict
9that the credit market will collapse in our R-NO treatment. Empirically, however,
a full collapse of the market would require that all lenders have an accurate initial
belief about the fraction of honest borrowers. This is a relatively strong assumption.
If some lenders start with excessively optimistic beliefs, there may be some trading
in the early periods of the experiment. However, as soon as learning takes place
and beliefs are updated, the credit market should break down.
In the R-CR treatment, lenders receive a credit report at the beginning of
each period stating, for each borrower and each prior period, whether the borrower
concluded a credit contract and whether he repaid his debt. In contrast to the R-
NO treatment, lenders in the R-CR can therefore condition their credit oﬀers on the
borrowers’ past repayment behavior. If selﬁsh borrowers anticipate the conditional
oﬀering of lenders they have a strong incentive to hide their type and imitate the
behavior of honest borrowers. Repaying a loan is the only way for selﬁsh borrowers
to build up a reputation as a honest type and to get access to proﬁtable future credit
oﬀers of lenders. In Proposition A2 in the Appendix, we show that this mechanism
can sustain an equilibrium in which a substantial credit volume is provided, even
in cases where the share of honest borrowers p is such that the credit market would
collapse in the R-NO treatment (p< 1
φ).4
Proposition A2 describes the following equilibrium behavior of lenders and bor-
rowers: In all periods lenders strictly condition their credit oﬀers on the borrowers’
past repayment behavior, i.e. they make only credit oﬀers to borrowers who have
never defaulted in the past. In a ﬁrst phase of the R-CR treatment this motivates
all selﬁsh borrowers to repay loans out of reputational concerns and accordingly
lenders extend the maximal credit volume. During this “pooling” phase selﬁsh
and honest borrowers behave identically and therefore no information about the
borrowers’ types is revealed. In later periods, reputational incentives decline and
repayment rates fall as selﬁsh borrowers begin to default with a positive proba-
bility. The partial defaulting of selﬁsh borrowers allows lenders to update their
beliefs about the borrowers’ types and ensures that lending does not lead to losses
for lenders. However, in this second phase, the aggregate credit volume begins to
fall as those borrowers who defaulted in prior periods receive no further loans and
those who repaid receive only loans with non-maximal credit sizes. Furthermore,
4The assumption that there are two types of borrowers implies that we analyze a ﬁnitely
repeated game with incomplete information. Such games are usually characterized by a large
number of equilibria (see Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). It is not our objective to provide a
complete formal analysis of our experimental game in the Appendix. We rather prove that there
are Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which the reputation mechanisms intuitively described in this
section ensure that a functioning credit market exists.
10competition among lenders implies that credit oﬀers are such that all gains from
trade go to the borrowers and lenders make zero proﬁts throughout the experiment.
In order to see that the equilibrium described above can indeed imply a sub-
stantial eﬃciency eﬀect, consider the following numerical example: Assume that
φ =1 .2 (honest borrowers are willing to repay 60 if they receive a loan of size 50)
and that p =0 .5 (50% of borrowers are honest). In this case the condition derived
in Proposition A1 shows that the credit market collapses in the R-NO treatment:
p =0 .5 < 1
φ =0 .83. Proposition A2, on the other hand, tells us that in the R-CR
treatment all borrowers could get full credit provision (k∗
t = 50) until period 17.
In period 17, selﬁsh borrowers start to default with a positive probability.5 From
period 18 on, those borrowers who no longer have a clean record do not get credit
oﬀers and the lenders begin to decrease the size of the loans extended.6 Taken
together this implies that the credit registry can have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
credit market eﬃciency. In our example the overall realized credit volume amounts
to 89 percent of the potentially possible credit volume.
Based on these considerations we state the following hypotheses for our R treat-
ments:
Hypothesis R Treatments: In the R-CR treatment the repayment rate of
borrowers is signiﬁcantly higher than in the R-NO treatment. In the R-NO
treatment, the low repayment rate leads to a collapse of the credit market. In the
R-CR treatment, credit volumes are signiﬁcantly higher than in the R-NO, albeit
with decreasing volumes towards the end of the experiment.
3.2 Predictions for the F Treatments
In the F-NO treatment, lenders do not have information on the behavior of all
borrowers in all prior periods. However, due to the ﬁxed identities, lenders do
have information on past behavior of those borrowers with whom they themselves
have traded in prior periods. Thus in contrast to the R-NO treatment, lenders
have the possibility to oﬀer attractive contract renewals to known borrowers with
satisfactory past repayment behavior. If repayment guarantees access to proﬁtable
loans from incumbent lenders, selﬁsh borrowers may also be motivated to repay.
Proposition A3 in the Appendix shows that there is an equilibrium in the F-NO
5The equilibrium repayment probabilities of selﬁsh borrowers γ∗






6The equilibrium size of loans k∗
t o ﬀ e r e di np e r i o d s1 8t o2 0a r e :k∗
18 =2 9 ,k∗
19 = 17, k∗
20 =1 0 .
11treatment in which endogenously formed banking relationships ensure the provision
of a substantial credit volume even in the case where the fraction of honest borrowers
is insuﬃcient to guarantee the existence of a credit market in the R-NO treatment
(p< 1
φ) and no credit registry is present.
The equilibrium behavior of lenders and borrowers derived in Proposition A3
can be described as follows: In the ﬁrst period all lenders make a competitive oﬀer
and try to conclude a contract with a borrower. Those lenders who succeed in
concluding a contract with a borrower in the ﬁrst period subsequently establish a
long-term relationship with their incumbent borrower. As long as the incumbent
borrower repays, they renew his contract in every period by making him a private
oﬀer. Lenders who could not conclude a contract in the ﬁrst period invest their
capital in the endowment-storing technology and remain outside the credit market.
The reason that they do not try to enter the market by making competitive oﬀers to
borrowers in relationships with other lenders is that they believe that such contract
oﬀers would only attract selﬁsh borrowers. As trading with selﬁsh borrowers is not
proﬁtable, they prefer to stay away from the credit market.
As outside lenders do not contest the market, lenders who have established a
relationship with a borrower can exert a certain market power. By making oﬀers
which just satisfy the conditions under which honest borrowers repay, they can skim
oﬀ part of the gains from trade in their relationship. Of course, in the ﬁrst period
lenders anticipate that they will earn a rent if they manage to establish a relation-
ship. Competition among lenders therefore implies that they are prepared to make
losses in the ﬁrst period in order to get access to the rents earned in a relationship.
Within the relationships, the conditional contract renewals of incumbent borrowers,
in combination with the fact outside lenders are not willing to oﬀer credit, motivates
selﬁsh borrowers to perfectly imitate the repayment behavior of honest borrowers
in a ﬁrst phase of the game. As lenders make proﬁts in these periods they maximize
their income by extending maximal credit amounts. During this “pooling” phase of
the experiment, no additional information about the types of borrowers is revealed
and the lenders’ beliefs remain constant at the initial level p. When the end of
the game draws near, however, lenders are only willing to renew their contracts if
they get additional information on the borrowers’ types. Therefore, in this phase,
selﬁsh borrowers start defaulting with positive probabilities and therewith ensure
that lenders can update their beliefs and remain willing to renew their contracts.
However, as defaulting borrowers no longer get credit oﬀers and as lenders start to
lower the size of their loans, the extended credit volume decreases towards the end
of the game.
12In order to show that a substantial credit volume can be sustained in this “rela-
tionship equilibrium”, we apply the numerical example from above to this situation
as well. As before, we start with the assumptions that φ =1 .2a n dp =0 .5. Propo-
sition A3 implies that the maximal credit provision (k∗
t = 50) can be sustained until
period 17. In period 17, selﬁsh lenders begin to default with a positive probability.7
In the subsequent periods not all borrowers get credit and lenders reduce the size of
the extended loans such that the total credit volume decreases in the ﬁnal periods
of the game.8 However, overall, 90 percent of the maximally possible credit volume
is issued.
In the F-CR treatment, the presence of a credit registry implies that lenders
have information not only on the behavior of their own prior borrowers, but on all
borrowers in the game. As a consequence, the equilibrium derived for the R-CR
treatment and described in detail in Proposition A2 of the Appendix also applies
for the F-CR treatment. Lenders condition their oﬀers strictly on borrowers’ credit
records, inducing certain repayment by all borrowers initially and positive repay-
ment probabilities for selﬁsh borrowers, even in the end-game phase. Due to strong
competition for borrowers, all (expected) gains from trade are reaped by borrowers
in all periods. Note, however, that even in the presence of a credit registry, the
relationship equilibrium described for the F-NO treatment in Proposition A3 in the
Appendix can also be sustained in the F-CR treatment. In this equilibrium, inside
lenders condition credit oﬀers on their incumbent borrowers’ prior behavior, while
outside lenders oﬀer no credit at all. The reason for this is that, even if outside
lenders have information on prior borrower behavior through the credit register, the
belief that only selﬁsh borrowers will switch will prevent them from making credit
oﬀers. As a consequence, selﬁsh borrowers again have an incentive to repay with
certainty in early periods of the experiment and with positive probability in the
end-game phase.
Our numerical example shows that the “credit-record equilibrium” described by
Proposition A2 and the relational equilibrium described by Proposition A3 yield
identical repayment rates and practically identical credit volumes. Thus market
performance in the F-CR should be similar to that in the F-NO treatment, indepen-
dent of which equilibrium type arises. However, market structure and distribution
of surplus will diﬀer between the F-CR and F-NO treatments if the “credit-registry
equilibrium” is played in the F-CR. As discussed above, long-term relationships
7The equilibrium repayment probabilities of selﬁsh borrowers γ∗
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13are not necessary to sustain the “credit-registry equilibrium” and would therefore
be observed less frequently than in the F-NO. Moreover, lenders who establish re-
lationships earn quasi-rents in the F-NO treatment while in the “credit-registry
equilibrium” all lenders earn zero proﬁts in all periods. Expecting that the pres-
ence of a credit registry in the F-CR will encourage at least some more competition
from outside lenders, we make the following hypothesis for our F treatments:
Hypothesis F Treatments: Repayment rates and credit volume are identical
in the F-NO and F-CR treatments: Both display high repayment rates and credit
volumes in an initial phase. Towards the ﬁnal period, however, some borrowers start
to default and credit volumes decrease. In the F-CR, the disciplining of borrowers
is less reliant on relationship lending, so that long-term relationships may be less
frequent. Moreover, the presence of a credit registry implies that in the F-CR it
may be more diﬃcult for lenders to extract proﬁts from relationships than in the
F-NO.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 No Relationship Banking
In this section we examine the impact of a credit registry when relationship bank-
ing is not possible, by comparing the outcome of the R-CR to that of the R-NO
treatment. We begin by examining the repayment behavior of borrowers. Our pre-
dictions suggest that, in the R-NO treatment, honest borrowers repay loans which
oﬀer “fair” contract terms while selﬁsh borrowers always default. In contrast, in
the R-CR treatment, the credit registry should also motivate selﬁsh borrowers to
repay in order to maintain a clean credit record and have future access to credit.
As a consequence, we expect a higher aggregate repayment rate in the R-CR than
in the R-NO treatment.
Figure 1 presents the repayment rate of borrowers by period for both treat-
ments. The ﬁgure shows that the repayment rate hovers around 30% throughout
the R-NO treatment, resulting in a total repayment rate of 29%. As predicted, the
presence of a credit registry leads to a substantially higher repayment rate in the
R-CR treatment. There the aggregate repayment rate is 80%. A non-parametric
test conﬁrms that the diﬀerence in repayment rates between the two treatments is
statistically signiﬁcant.9
9We conduct a Mann-Whitney Test using mean repayment rates per session as observations.
The 5 sessions of the R-CR treatment display repayment rates of 87, 85, 81, 77 and 70 percent
14Even if the credit registry in the R-CR treatment does discipline selﬁsh borrowers
to repay loans, we expect that the repayment rate will fall towards the end of the
experiment. Remember that the value of a good credit record declines towards the
end of our experiment, due to the ﬁnite horizon of 20 periods. We therefore expect
that selﬁsh borrowers who repay in earlier periods out of reputational concerns, will
default in the ﬁnal periods. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that, in the ﬁnal periods of the
R-CR treatment, loan repayments drop substantially. While 86% of all loans are
repaid in period 1 through 15, this falls to less than 50% in the last ﬁve periods of
the R-CR treatment. Moreover, as predicted, the repayment rate in the ﬁnal period
of the R-CR treatment falls to that of the R-NO treatment.
Figure 1: Repayment Rates in R Treatments
Figure 1 suggests that the presence of the credit registry in the R-CR treatment
motivates loan repayments from selﬁsh borrowers who would otherwise default.
Note, however, that the higher repayment rate in the R-CR could also be explained
by more favorable contract terms for borrowers in that treatment than in the R-NO.
This would induce honest borrowers to repay more often in the R-CR than in the
R-NO treatment. In order to control for diﬀerences in contract terms we conduct a
respectively. In the R-NO treatment the ﬁve sessions have repayment rates of 39, 31, 29, 26 and
16 percent respectively. A one-sided test thus cannot reject the hypothesis that repayment is more
frequent in the R-CR treatment (p = .004).
15multivariate analysis of repayment behavior.
Table 2 presents the results of a regression analysis of repayment decisions in
which we pool all observations from the R-CR and R-NO treatment. Our dependant
variable is a dummy variable which is 1 if a borrower repaid and 0 if he defaulted.
We control for the size of loans and the desired repayment by including the variables
“CreditSize” and “RepaymentSize”. Our main explanatory variable is the dummy
variable “R-CR”, which is 1 for all observations in the R-CR treatment and 0
for all those in the R-NO treatment. If repayment rates are higher in the R-CR,
ceteris paribus, we should see a positive coeﬃcient for this variable. Our further
explanatory variables are the dummy variable “FinalPeriods” and the interaction
term “R-CR*FinalPeriods”. The variable “FinalPeriods” takes on the value 1 if
the decision was made in period 16 or later, and 0 for earlier periods. We do not
expect any time eﬀect on repayment in the R-NO treatment and therefore that
“FinalPeriods” should be insigniﬁcant. However, as the disciplining eﬀect of a
credit registry on selﬁsh borrowers declines in the ﬁnal periods of the experiment,
we expect a negative coeﬃcient for the interaction term “R-CR*FinalPeriods”.
Table 2: Repayment Behavior in the R-Treatments










R2 =. 3 6
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors clus-
tered on sessions. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%
level, **at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
The results presented in Table 2 show that an identical credit oﬀer is more likely
to be repaid in the R-CR treatment than in the R-NO treatment.10 As predicted,
10Since observations within sessions may be dependent we report for all regressions in this paper
robust standard errors with clustering on sessions. Given that our explanatory variable in Table
16our main explanatory variable, “R-CR”, is signiﬁcantly positive. Furthermore,
the display coeﬃcients show that the reputational eﬀects are weaker towards the
end of the experiment. The interaction term “R-CR*FinalPeriods” is signiﬁcantly
negative, while the main eﬀect on “Finalperiods”displays an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient.
This conﬁrms that there is a strong end-game eﬀect in the R-CR which is not present
in the R-NO treatment. These ﬁndings support our conjecture that the presence
of a credit registry in the R-CR treatment has motivated selﬁsh borrowers to repay
loans more often than in the R-NO.
Table 3: Reputation and Credit Access in the R-CR treatment
Share of Prior Loans Repaid
<. 5 .5 − .75 >. 75 Total
Credit Size (mean) 30.9 30.1 40.2 38.4
Interest Rate (mean) 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.33
Observations 23 101 576 700
We expect that borrowers in the R-CR treatment will repay loans more often
than in the R-NO because they beneﬁt from having a good record in the credit
registry. We should therefore ﬁnd that in the R-CR treatment the availability of
credit is positively correlated with a borrower’s repayment record. Moreover, as
all lenders have the same information and must compete for borrowers, we expect
that those borrowers with good credit records will be oﬀered lower costs of credit.
Table 3 shows that this is the case. For each borrower we establish his reputation
at the beginning of each period by calculating the share of prior loans which he
has repaid. We classify the reputation of each borrower into three categories: low,
if he has repaid less than 50% of prior loans; medium if he has repaid 50-75% of
prior loans; and high if he has repaid more than 75% of prior loans. Table 3 shows
that, in the R-CR treatment, borrowers with a better reputation get higher volumes
of credit. The mean credit size of a borrower with a high reputation is 10 units
larger than that of a borrower with a low or medium reputation. Furthermore,
the table shows that the cost of credit for borrowers with high reputations is lower
than for borrowers with medium or low reputations. We calculate the interest rate
([repayment - credit size]/credit size) demanded by lenders for each realized loan
contract. The table shows that, on average, lenders charge 10% less interest to
2 is a dummy variable the probit method would be appropriate. However, as clustering is not
feasible for probit regressions, we use the linear probability model (see also Moﬃtt, 1999).
17high reputation borrowers than from low reputation borrowers. Linear regression
analyses controlling for the period of interaction conﬁrm that credit size is positively
correlated with a borrowers reputation (coef.= 24.2,p= .02), while the cost of credit
is negatively correlated with this reputation (coef.= −1.18,p= .01).11
In the R-NO treatment the past repayment behavior of borrowers has no impact
at all on their access to credit. Identical regression analyses for this treatment
show that neither credit size (coef.= −.03,p= .99) nor the cost of credit (coef.=
−.03,p = .45) is correlated with a borrower’s prior repayment record. This is by
no means surprising, given that borrower identities are changed randomly in each
period. As a consequence there is no incentive at all in the R-NO treatment for
selﬁsh borrowers to repay loans.
Figure 2: Credit Volume in R Treatments
If lenders anticipate the disciplining eﬀect of the credit registry in the R-CR
treatment, we would expect them to extend a higher volume of credit than they do
in the R-NO treatment. Figure 2 shows that this is the case. The ﬁgure displays the
realized credit volume per period as a percentage of the maximum credit volume
across sessions for the R-CR and R-NO treatments. 12 In the R-CR treatment,
11We conduct the following linear regressions: CreditSizei,t= α + β1*PriorRepaymentSharei,t
+β2*Periodt + ε, and InterestRatei,t= α + β1 *PriorRepaymentSharei,t +β2*Periodt + ε.E s t i -
mates in both regressions are based on robust standard errors and control for dependencies within
sessions by applying the clustering method.
12As the maximum loan size was 50 units and 7 loans were possible in each period, the maximum
18almost the maximum number of loans are made from period 1 through to period 18.
The average credit size is also constantly high in this treatment, with mean credit
size rising from an initial level of 34 to over 45 in period 13. As a consequence, the
total volume of credit rises from 64 percent in period 1 to 92% in period 12 and
remains above 80% until period 17. Not surprisingly, credit volume then falls in the
ﬁnal periods of the R-CR treatment. We saw previously that the repayment rate
of borrowers declines towards the end of the experiment in the R-CR treatment.
Figure 2 shows that this is anticipated by lenders who extend lower credit volumes.
Figure 2 shows a completely diﬀerent picture for the R-NO treatment. Surpris-
ingly, this treatment also starts oﬀ with a substantial credit volume. In period 1 of
the R-NO treatment, 7 loans are made in all sessions with an average loan size of 31.
However, the number and size of loans then falls rapidly. From period 11 onwards
fewer than 4 trades are made on average per period and this falls to less than 2
credits in the ﬁnal periods. In addition, the mean credit size is lower than 20 from
period 9 onwards. As a consequence, Figure 2 shows that total credit volume falls
steadily in the R-NO treatment and is less than 20% from period 13 onwards. On
aggregate, lenders in the R-CR treatment extended 77% of potential credit, while
in the R-NO treatment aggregate credit was only 27% of its potential volume. A
non-parametric test conﬁrms that this diﬀerence in credit volume is signiﬁcant.13
The presence of a credit registry thus increases credit volume substantially when
relationship banking is not feasible. Who beneﬁts from this increase in credit market
performance? We predicted that strong competition for borrowers in our experiment
would erode any proﬁts among lenders. Indeed, it turns out that all gains from trade
in the R-CR treatment are reaped by borrowers. Table 4 displays the mean payoﬀ
of lenders, depending on the amount of credit they have extended. Remember that
in all treatments lenders who do not extend credit earn a payoﬀ of 50. The table
shows that, in the R-CR treatment, lenders earn payoﬀs close to this outside option
independent of the volume of credit they extend. This is conﬁrmed by a regression
analysis of lenders’ payoﬀs in the R-CR treatment, which shows that these are
uncorrelated with credit size (coef.= .11,p= .27).14
credit volume per period in a session was 350 units.
13We conduct a one-sided Mann-Whitney test using total credit volume per session as obser-
vations (p = .004). In the R-NO treatment the ﬁve sessions display a credit volume (measured
in percentage of the total potential volume) of 36, 29, 29, 24 and 16 percent respectively. In the
R-CR treatment, the credit volume per session was 84, 81, 78, 76 and 66 percent respectively.
14For the R-CR and R-NO data separately, we conduct the following linear regression:
LenderPayoﬀi,t= α + β1*CreditSizei +β2*Periodt + ε. Estimates in both regressions are based
on robust standard errors and allow for dependencies within sessions by applying the clustering
method.
19Table 4: Loan Size and Lender Payoﬀs
Credit Size
0 5-10 15-20 25-30 35-40 45-50 Total
R-CR 50.0 50.0 48.9 50.1 50.0 51.9 50.6
R-NO 50.0 44.0 38.5 35.4 18.7 17.3 44.0
In contrast to the R-CR treatment, lenders who do extend credit in the R-
NO earn less than their outside option. Table 4 shows, indeed, that lenders who
extend loans of more than 30 units earn on average less than half their outside
option. A regression analysis of lenders’ payoﬀs on credit size conﬁrms that these
are negatively correlated in the R-NO treatment (coef.= −.68,p= .004). Table 4
thus shows that the presence of a credit registry in the R-CR treatment makes it
feasible to lend, while in the R-NO treatment lenders can only make losses. This
explains our ﬁnding that the credit market is sustained in the presence of a credit
registry while it collapses otherwise.
Our results in this section suggest that a credit registry can greatly enhance
the performance of a credit market when relationship banking is not feasible. The
exchange of information between lenders generates incentives for borrowers who
would otherwise default to repay loans . This makes it feasible for lenders to extend
high credit volumes, despite the fact that repayment is not third-party enforceable.
Strong competition among lenders implies that all surplus generated through the
presence of the credit registry is reaped by borrowers.
4.2 Credit Reporting and Relationship Banking
In this section we examine the impact of a credit registry in a market where banking
relationships are feasible. We begin again by comparing the repayment behavior of
borrowers in the F-CR and F-NO treatments. Our predictions suggest that, in both
treatments, selﬁsh borrowers will initially repay loans out of reputational concerns.
In the F-CR treatment, selﬁsh borrowers can build a public reputation for being
honest because their behavior is communicated to all lenders through the credit
registry. In the F-NO treatment, borrowers cannot build a public reputation for
themselves as there is no credit registry. However, by repaying loans the borrower
can build a reputation with a particular lender. Our predictions showed that such
relationship banking is capable of enforcing the same repayment rates as a credit
registry.
20Figure 3 shows that the repayment behavior of borrowers is very similar in the
two treatments. In the ﬁrst four periods, repayment rates are slightly higher in the
F-CR treatment than in the F-NO. This suggests that reputational incentives may
be more obvious in a market where a credit registry is present. However, from pe-
riod 5 onwards, repayment rates are identical in both treatments, hovering around
80% until period 17. The aggregate repayment rate in the F-CR treatment (79%) is
slightly higher than that in the F-NO treatment (74%). However, a non-parametric
test shows that repayment behavior does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the treat-
ments.15 As predicted, repayment rates fall towards the end of the experiment
in both treatments. In period 19 and 20 repayment rates in both treatments are
roughly 50%. This result suggests that high levels of repayment in earlier periods
are due to the strategic behavior of selﬁsh borrowers rather than an overwhelming
presence of honest borrowers.
Figure 3: Repayment Rates in F Treatments
Figure 3 suggests that, in both the F-NO and F-CR treatments, borrowers had
strong reputational incentives to repay loans. This is conﬁrmed by looking at how
15In the ﬁve sessions of the F-CR treatment, repayment rates are 86, 82, 78, 76 and 72 percent
respectively. In comparison, the ﬁve F-NO sessions show repayment rates of 79, 77, 76, 72 and
68 percent respectively. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test using these session averages as observa-
tions cannot reject the hypothesis that repayment rates are identical in the F-CR and the F-NO
treatment (p = .22).
21loan size and the cost of credit for borrowers depends on their prior repayment
record. As in the previous section, we establish the reputation of each borrower
at the beginning of each period by calculating the share of prior loans which he
has repaid. We then examine how the size of credit obtained by the borrower and
the interest rate paid for credit depends on this reputation. Table 5 shows that,
in both treatments, borrowers with better repayment records get larger loans and
pay less interest. Linear regressions controlling for the period of interaction conﬁrm
that credit availability is positively correlated with a borrower’s reputation in the
F-CR (coef.= 33.1,p = .001) and the F-NO treatment (coef.= 33.4,p = .001).
Regression analyses also conﬁrm that the cost of credit is negatively correlated
with a borrower’s reputation in the F-CR (coef.= −.32,p = .02) and the F-NO
treatment (coef.= −.24,p= .04).16 In light of the results in our previous section,
it is not surprising that credit access is conditioned on a borrower’s credit record
in the F-CR treatment. The fact, however, that this is also the case in the F-NO
treatment, where no credit registry exists, and prior behavior is only known to a
borrower’s lender already suggests that relationship banking is important in this
treatment.
Table 5: Reputation and Credit Access in the F- Treatments
Share of Prior Loans Repaid
<. 5 .5 − .75 >. 75 Total
F-CR
Credit Size (mean) 25.7 31.6 42.9 39.6
Interest Rate (mean) 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.29
Observations 46 133 521 700
F-NO
Credit Size (mean) 18.5 34.4 42.0 36.9
Interest Rate (mean) 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.26
Observations 86 201 413 700
Figure 3 and Table 5 suggest that incentives for borrowers to repay loans are
equally high in the F-CR and F-NO treatments, conﬁrming our predictions that a
credit registry is not necessary to enforce repayment when relationship banking is
feasible. As a consequence, we should see that credit volume (and thus market per-
formance) is similar in the two treatments. Figure 4 conﬁrms that this is the case.
16We conduct the following linear regressions: CreditSizei,t= α + β1*PriorRepaymentSharei,t
+β2*Periodt + ε, and InterestRatei,t= α + β1*PriorRepaymentSharei,t +β2*Periodt + ε.E s t i -
mates in both regressions are based on robust standard errors and control for dependencies within
sessions by applying the clustering method.
22The ﬁgure displays the credit volume extended in the F-CR and F-NO treatments
by period (again as a percentage of total potential volume). We see that the high
repayment rates encourage lenders to disburse large volumes of credit in both treat-
ments. On aggregate, 94% of potential loans are made in the F-CR treatment and
91.6% in the F-NO treatment. Moreover, the average size of these loans is very high
in both treatments. From an initial level of 35, average loan size climbs to above 40
during the ﬁrst ten periods, and then remains between 40 and 45 for the rest of the
experiment. As a consequence, total credit volume rises to more than 80% in both
treatments. Not surprisingly, both treatments record a fall in credit volume in the
ﬁnal periods. Again lenders anticipate the fall in reputational incentives for selﬁsh
borrowers and decrease their lending activities. Aggregate market performance is
slightly higher in the F-CR (79%) than in the F-NO (74%) treatment. However, a
non-parametric test cannot reject the hypothesis that credit volume is identical in
both treatments.17
Figure 4: Credit Volume in F Treatments
Figure 4 conﬁrms our prediction that credit market performance does not depend
on the existence of a credit registry when relationship banking is feasible. However,
we also predict that market outcome may diﬀer in terms of trading structure and
17In the ﬁve sessions of the F-CR treatment, credit volume was 82, 82, 80, 76 and 76 percent
of potential credit volumes respectively. In comparison, the ﬁve F-NO sessions yielded 81, 78, 72,
69 and 69 percent respectively. A two-sided Mann-Whitney using session totals as observations
yields p = .15.
23distribution. For the F-NO treatment we predicted that the credit market would be
pervaded by long-term relationships as quasi-rents in relationships are the key to
disciplining borrowers. Moreover, given that relationships arise we predicted that
lenders would also earn positive proﬁts within these relationships. By contrast,
the existence of a credit registry in the F-CR implies that long-term relationships
between particular borrowers and lenders are not necessary to discipline borrowers.
Moreover, as all lenders know the repayment history of all borrowers, competition
for borrowers should reduce the ability of lenders to extract rents from relationships.
We thus predict that there will be fewer relationships in the F-CR treatment than in
the F-NO treatment. Moreover, we predict that lenders who establish relationships
make less proﬁts in the F-CR in the F-NO treatment
Table 6 shows that market outcome in the F-NO treatment is characterized by
more relationships than in the F-CR. The table reports the share of renewed loans,
i.e. the share of transactions which involved the same lender - borrower pair as in
the previous period for diﬀerent phases of both treatments. In the F-NO treatment
the share of renewals climbs from just below 40% in the initial periods to over
50% in period 11 through 20. Aggregated over all periods, the share of renewed
contracts in the F-NO treatment is 48%. Thus roughly half of all loans made in
this treatment involve the same lender and borrower as in the previous period.
Table 6: Share of Renewed Loans
Periods
2 - 56 - 1 01 1 - 1 51 6 - 2 0T o t a l
F-CR 0.24 0.39 0.39 0.54 0.39
F-NO 0.38 0.44 0.58 0.50 0.48
Table 6 shows that credit relationships are also quite common even when a credit
registry exists. In the F-CR treatment the share of credit renewals is initially less
than 25%, but rises steadily over the course of the experiment, also exceeding 50%
in the ﬁnal phase of the experiment. As predicted, the share of renewed credit in
the F-CR treatment, at 39%, is lower than that in the F-NO. However, due to a
strong variation across sessions, a non-parametric test indicates that this diﬀerence
is not signiﬁcant.18
18In the ﬁve sessions of the F-NO, average renewal rates are 53, 53, 52, 36 and 34 percent
respectively. In comparison, the ﬁve F-CR sessions have renewal rates of 52, 41, 40, 30 and 21
percent respectively. A one-sided Mann-Whitney test using these session averages as observations
24The data presented in Table 6 may seem surprising. Although lenders have ac-
cess to a credit registry in the F-CR treatment it seems that they still rely strongly
on credit relationships to motivate loan repayment. This ﬁnding is less surprising
when we compare the information available within a relationship to that available
from a credit registry. Within a long term relationship, lenders typically have much
more information about a borrower than they could elicit from a credit report. In
our experiment this was also the case. Our credit registry only provided information
on whether a borrower repaid a loan or not. Within a relationship, however, the
lender had additional information on contract terms (credit size, repayment size)
which a lender had accepted and repaid. Table 6 suggests that this additional in-
formation encouraged lenders to maintain relationships with a particular borrower,
although they could easily obtain the credit record of each borrower at no cost.
Given that relationships are prevalent in both treatments, how does this aﬀect
the distribution of surplus between lenders and borrowers? Do lenders manage to
extract rents from relations in both treatments? Or does the existence of a credit
registry in the F-CR treatment mean that lenders earn less rents because “outside”
competitors are better informed about each borrower. Table 7 reports how the prof-
its of a lender depend on the duration of relationship with a borrower. We establish
the total duration of each relationship between a lender and a borrower by calcu-
lating the number of renewed interactions between the two. For each relationship
we then calculate the mean proﬁts per period for the lender.
Table 7: Relationships and Lender Proﬁts
Relationship Duration
1-2 3-10 11-20 Total
F-NO 40.0 57.3 56.5 47.7
F-CR 47.9 51.9 56.8 49.8
The table shows that, on aggregate, payoﬀs of lenders in both treatments are
very close to their outside option of 50. This suggests that competition for bor-
rowers has eroded expected proﬁts among lenders. The table, however, also shows
that the proﬁts earned by lenders in both treatments depend on their ability to
establish and maintain relationships. In the F-NO treatment, lenders who were
engaged in short-term interactions (1-2 periods) made substantial losses. In con-
rejects the hypothesis that credit relationships are more frequent in the F-NO than in the F-CR
treatment (p = .15).
25trast, those lenders who established a relationship of more than 2 periods ended
up earning a (small) rent. This conﬁrms our prediction that lenders extract some
quasi-rents from relationships in the F-NO due to their superior information about
their incumbent borrower. A regression analysis of lender proﬁts on relationship
duration, controlling for the period of the experiment, conﬁrms that proﬁts increase
with relationship duration (coef.= 1.33,p= .004).19
With the presence of a credit registry in the R-CR treatment, lenders do not
make such signiﬁcant losses in short-term interactions as they do in the R-NO. It
seems that the credit registry enables lenders to avoid interaction with would-be
defaulters in the R-CR. Moreover, in medium-term relationships (3-10 periods),
lenders do not earn any substantial rents. This suggests that, in comparison to
the F–NO treatment, public information about the repayment history of a bor-
rower in the F-CR prevented lenders from extracting rents from such relationships.
We do ﬁnd, however, that in very long-term relationships lenders did earn similar
rents in the F-CR treatment to those earned in the F-NO. A regression analysis of
lender proﬁts shows that proﬁts increase with relationship duration in the F-CR
(coef.= 0.78,p= .008). However, the coeﬃcient of the regression also conﬁrms our
prediction that lenders beneﬁt less from long-term relationships than in the F-NO
treatment.20. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the presence of a credit registry does reduce
the potential of lenders to hold-up borrowers in relations.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we applied experimental methods to examine the impact of a pub-
lic credit registry on the repayment behavior of borrowers in a competitive credit
market. Our results suggest that the impact of a credit registry depends strongly
on the nature of credit transactions. Credit reporting is highly valuable in markets
where banking relationships are diﬃcult to establish, for example, due to highly
mobile borrowers. In such markets, the disciplining of borrowers to repay loans
is strongly dependent on the existence of an information-sharing mechanism. By
contrast, in markets where relationship banking is prevalent, these relationships
19We conducted the following linear regression: LenderProﬁti,t= α + β1*Relationshipdurationi
+β2*Periodt + ε. Estimates are based on robust standard errors and control for dependencies
within sessions by applying the clustering method.
20To conﬁrm this we pooled the data from both treatments and conducted the follow-
ing linear regression: LenderProﬁti,t= α + β1*Relationshipdurationi +β2*Periodt + β3*F-
CR+β4∗Relationshipdurationi*F-CR+ ε, again controlling for dependencies within sessions by ap-
plying the clustering method. In this regression the interaction eﬀect F-CR*Relationshipduration
yielded a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient
26may themselves motivate repayment, so that a credit registry has little impact on
borrower behavior.
Our results suggest two consequences for the design of credit registries and credit
bureaus. First, it may not always be optimal for lenders to share all available in-
formation on borrowers. In markets where relationship banking is prevalent, the
potential disciplining eﬀect of credit reporting is negligible so that it is optimal to
share as much information as is available on borrowers. By contrast, when relation-
ship banking is diﬃcult to maintain, the disciplining eﬀect is potentially important,
so that it may be optimal to limit the type of information shared (as suggested
by Padilla and Pagano, 2000) and the length of credit histories (as suggested by
Vercammen, 1995).
Second, when relationship banking is diﬃcult to maintain, lenders should make
sure that the existence of credit bureaus and credit registries is well-known to bor-
rowers. Rather than share information secretly, as is the current practice in some
countries (Luoto et al., 1994), lenders should make sure that borrowers are aware
that their repayment behavior will be recorded and could aﬀect their future access
to credit.
Our methodology and results suggest several avenues of future research. First,
experimental methods could be applied to study the endogenous emergence of in-
formation sharing. Theoretical models (Klein, 1992; Jappelli and Pagano, 1993)
suggest that private credit bureaus are more likely to emerge when they are most
valuable to lenders. Experimental methods would make it possible to examine this
hypothesis by studying the emergence of credit bureaus in a variety of market envi-
ronments. Experimental methods could also be applied to study alternative designs
of credit bureaus and credit registries. As suggested by theoretical work (Padilla
and Pagano, 2000; Vercammen, 1995), the type of information recorded by a credit
registry, the history of credit records provided, and also the incentive mechanisms
related to providing and retrieving information may aﬀect the functioning and im-
pact of a credit registry. It would be valuable to study these eﬀects in a controlled
manner through carefully designed experiments.
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30A Appendix
A.1 Model and Assumptions
There are m lenders and n<mborrowers in a game which lasts for T>1p e r i o d s .
In each period t each lender has ¯ k units of capital to lend. Capital has an opportunity





in each period to any one borrower. In order to do so, the ﬁrst stage of each
period is such that all lenders can simultaneously submit a credit oﬀer to any subset of
borrowers.21 Ac r e d i to ﬀ e r[ kt, ˜ rt] consists of a loan size kt a n dad e s i r e dr e p a y m e n t˜ rt
(principal plus interest). At the second stage of each period borrowers choose in random
order from the available oﬀers. In each period borrowers are free to accept one of the
available loans or not to borrow at all. The repayment of a loan cannot be enforced
by the lender. At stage three of each period the borrower can choose to either make
the requested repayment rt =˜ rt or not repay at all rt = 0 (gradual repayments are not
possible).
The period payoﬀ of a lender πt is calculated as follows:
πt = ¯ k − kt + rt
Each borrower has a ﬁxed return a from self-ﬁnanced projects in each period. Addi-
tionally, the borrower can invest any capital kt borrowed in a safe project which yields a
safe return of bkt,w h e r eb>1.
The period payoﬀ of a borrower vt is therefore given by:
vt(kt,r t, ˜ rt)=a + bkt − rt
There are 2 types of borrowers: A share p are honest types who suﬀer mental costs
g(˜ rt,k t) (bad conscience / inequity aversion) if they don’t repay in cases where they
perceive the ﬁnancing conditions as “fair” (i.e., in cases where the desired repayment
does not exceed a certain reference value ˜ rt ≤ φk), the rest of the borrowers are purely
selﬁsh proﬁt-maximizers. Thus, the period utility of borrower can be written as:
ut(kt,r t, ˜ rt)=vt − g(˜ rt,k t)
where the mental costs g(˜ rt,k t) are deﬁned as follows:
21Since continuous auctions have deﬁed a fully rigorous analysis so far we make this
assumption on the trading mechanism for tractability reasons.
31g(˜ rt,k t)honest =
 
∞ if rt < ˜ rt ≤ φk
0i f rt ≥ ˜ rt or ˜ rt >φ k
g(˜ rt,k t)selﬁsh =0
As a consequence honest borrowers always repay their loans as long as they have
received “fair” ﬁnancing conditions in a given period. With respect to the reference
repayment of honest borrowers, we assume that φ ∈ (1,(b +1 ) /2]. This means that the
reference repayment is somewhere in between the repayment where all the gains from
trade go to the borrower and the repayment where the gains from trade are equally split
between lender and borrower.
The total material surplus per trade is given by
πt(kt,r t) − ¯ k + ut(kt,r t, ˜ rt) − a =( b − 1)kt
Since we assume that b>1 it is value maximizing if the maximum credit volume ¯ k is
provided in each transaction period.
In the following we derive equilibria of this game for diﬀerent credit market conditions.
In section A.2 we analyze a credit market, in which lenders and borrowers interact only
in one-oﬀ situations. In section A.3 we investigate a credit market where the market
participants have the possibility to engage in repeat interactions. In each environment
we examine both the case without information sharing between banks and the case of a
public credit registry with mandatory reporting.
The incomplete information nature of the game (i.e. uncertainty about the players’
types) implies that it should be analyzed as reputation game analogous to the one de-
scribed in Kreps et al. (1982). The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Such games are generally characterized by a large number of equilibria (see Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986)). However, our aim is not to provide a complete formal analysis of
the game, but rather to show, that there are equilibria in the R-CR, F-NO and F-CR
treatments in which the reputational mechanisms intuitively described in section 3 ensure
that a substantial credit volume can be sustained.
A.2 Lending without Relationship Banking
In each period all market participants receive freshly assigned identiﬁcation numbers.
Lenders therefore cannot recognize any of the borrowers, even if they have ﬁnanced them
before.
32A.2.1 Lending without a Credit Registry
Lenders do not receive any information on the prior behavior of any borrower in the
market. Each period t can therefore be viewed as a one-period game. In the following
we consequently drop the time index t and analyze the one-period outcome. Proposition
A1 establishes that in the one-oﬀ situation lenders are only willing to extend credit if the
fraction of honest borrowers p is suﬃciently large.
Proposition A1: If p ≥ 1
φ there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all
borrowers receive maximum credit ¯ k.I fp<1
φ no credit is extended in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition A1: Lenders anticipate that honest borrowers will always repay
a loan k only if ˜ r(k) ≤ φk, while selﬁsh borrowers will never repay a loan. The expected
proﬁt of a lender is thus:
Eπ(k,˜ r(k)) =
  ¯ k − k + p˜ r(k)i f ˜ r(k) ≤ φk
¯ k − k if ˜ r(k) >φ k
Thus only if there exists a k>0 for which pφk > k will any lender oﬀer any credit. Put
diﬀerently this requires that p ≥ 1
φ. If this condition is satisﬁed lenders can proﬁtably
extend credit. Due to competition among lenders these will earn zero proﬁts so that
pr∗(k)=k. Honest borrowers thus earn u(k∗,r∗)=a + bk − r∗(k)=a +( b − 1
p)k∗.
Borrowers prefer the highest possible credit level as our parameter assumptions imply
bp > 1. We have therefore established that in a one-period game the equilibrium contract
oﬀer of lenders will be
[k∗,r∗]=









A.2.2 Lending with a Credit Registry
At the end of each period lenders are exogenously forced (legal obligation) to submit
information on the repayment behavior of their current borrower to a public credit registry.
In return they receive a credit report which states for each borrower and each past period
whether the borrower got a loan and whether he repaid his loan or not. The provision of
information and access to the credit registry information has no cost for lenders.
Proposition A2 shows that even if the share of honest borrowers would lead to a
market collapse in a one-shot transaction (i.e., if p<1
φ (Proposition A1)), a public credit
33registry can sustain substantial credit volumes. In the derived equilibrium reputational
concerns motivate selﬁsh borrowers to perfectly imitate the behavior of honest borrowers
in the early periods of the game. However, this “pooling” of behavior across types cannot
b eo p t i m a li na l lp e r i o d s . T h er e a s o ni st h ef o l l o w i n g : A sl o n ga ss e l ﬁ s ha n dh o n e s t
borrowers behave identically lenders cannot get any additional information about the
type of speciﬁc borrowers and therefore their belief remains at the initial level p<1
φ.B u t
since lenders anticipate that selﬁsh borrowers never repay in the last period their belief
must be at least 1
φ at the beginning of the last period, otherwise they are not willing
to extend credit (see Proposition A1). Consequently, when the ﬁnal period draws near
selﬁsh borrowers start to partly default allowing lenders to update their beliefs about the
type of speciﬁc borrowers. Thus, it is the partial defaulting of selﬁsh lenders that ensures
that lenders strongly enough believe in the honesty of repaying borrowers in order to
be willing to oﬀer credit in periods near the end of the game. As a consequence of the
“pooling” behavior in the early periods of the experiment the maximal credit volume can
be sustained in these periods. In the later periods when selﬁsh borrowers begin to default
the credit volume decreases.
Proposition A2: Consider a credit market game of T ≥ 2 periods and suppose that
1
φT <p<1
φ. With exogenous credit reporting the following strategies and beliefs form a
perfect bayesian equilibrium.
• In all periods all lenders oﬀer a contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t] to all borrowers who always repaid in
the past. No lender oﬀers any credit to a borrower who defaulted in any previous








 ¯ k,¯ k
 












if t = T − s + l for all l ∈{ 1,2,...,s}
where s is the smallest integer that satisﬁes p ≥ 1
φs+1.
• Honest borrowers accept the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]i na l lp e r i o d st and repay the loan in
each period.
• Selﬁsh borrowers accept the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]i na l lp e r i o d st. Their repayment
probability γ∗




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i f t<T− s
(φs−1)p
1−p if t = T − s
φs−l−1
φs+1−l−1 if t = T − s + l for all l ∈{ 1,2,...,s − 1}
0i f t = T
• Lenders believe that any borrower who defaults on a loan in periods t<T− s is
selﬁsh.
Proof of Proposition A2: P r o o fi sb yc o n s t r u c t i o na n di se s t a b l i s h e di n4s t e p s :
Step 1 (repayment by honest borrowers): Honest borrowers will repay in each period
as long as their ﬁnancing conditions are fair; i.e. ˜ r∗
t ≤ φk∗
t. Given the strategies of
lenders this condition is satisﬁed in every period.
Step 2 (repayment by selﬁsh borrowers): In period T selﬁsh borrowers will always
default. In non-ﬁnal periods t<Tselﬁsh borrowers will repay with a positive
probability if their following incentive constraint is met:−rt + V R
t+1 ≥ V D
t+1,w h e r e
V R
t+1 and V D
t+1 represent the future expected utilities of a selﬁsh borrower at the
beginning of period t+1 after repaying respectively defaulting in period t.W eﬁ r s t
consider a selﬁsh borrower’s incentives in the next to last period T − 1: Given the
lenders’ strategies above we have V R
T = a + bk∗
T = a +
¯ k
pbs−1φ and V D




pbs−1φ the incentive constraint is met with equality in period T − 1. It
is therefore a best strategy for the selﬁsh borrower to repay with any probability
γ∗





T =2 a +
¯ k
pbs−2φ2 and V D
T =2 a.A s ˜ r∗
T−2 =
¯ k
pbs−2φ2 the incentive constraint is
again met with equality in period T − 2 and it is therefore a best strategy for the
selﬁsh borrower to repay with any probability γ∗
T−2 ∈ [0,1]. The same argument
can be made for all periods t>T−s.I np e r i o dT −s the lenders’ strategies imply
that V R






T−s+l = sa + bk∗




T = sa.S i n c er∗
T−s =
¯ k
pφs also the incentive constraint in period T −s is satisﬁed
with equality such that any repayment probability γ∗
T−s ∈ [0,1] is a best reply for a
selﬁsh borrower. In periods t<T− s all lenders oﬀer the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]=
 ¯ k,¯ k
 
with certainty. As ˜ r∗
t = ¯ k<b ¯ k the incentive constraint is met with inequality in
these periods. It is therefore a best strategy for selﬁsh borrowers to repay with
probability γ∗
t = 1 in all periods t<T− s.
Step 3 (beliefs of lenders): In equilibrium all borrowers of the same type play identical
strategies. As all lenders have access to the credit registry they have identical
35information concerning borrowers’ types in each period. At the beginning of each
period all lenders form a belief about the honesty of each borrower based on the
information retrieved from the credit registry. In equilibrium the lenders’ contract
oﬀers are such that honest borrowers always have an incentive to repay. In periods
t<T− s also selﬁsh borrowers repay with certainty in equilibrium. As defaulting
is oﬀ the equilibrium path in these periods, Bayes’ Rule does not apply and it must
be speciﬁed how lenders update their beliefs in case of default: We assume that
lenders have the out-of-equilibrium belief that any borrower without a clean record
is selﬁsh. In periods T − s ≤ t ≤ T only selﬁsh borrowers default with a positive
probability in equilibrium such that lenders rationally believe that not repaying
borrowers are selﬁsh. Bayesian updating implies that the belief about borrowers








Step 4 (contract oﬀers of lenders): The fact that in equilibrium all lenders have identical
information concerning the borrowers’ types implies a competitive market for clients
and therefore lenders earn zero proﬁts in each period. The desired repayment ˜ r∗
t
yields zero proﬁts if [pe




t. In the ﬁnal period T selﬁsh borrowers
always default (γ∗
T = 0). In equilibrium lenders’ desired repayment in T is ˜ r∗
t = φk∗
t.
Thus, lenders are only willing to extend credit to borrowers for which their belief is
at least pe
T = 1
φ. Selﬁsh borrowers must therefore choose their repayment probability
in period T − 1 so that this necessary belief in T is achieved: γ∗
T−1 =
pe
T−1(¯ r(¯ k)−¯ k)
¯ k(1−pe
T−1) .
However, also in period T − 1 lenders are only willing to extend credit if they
earn at least zero-proﬁts. This implies that the repayment probability of selﬁsh
borrowers γ∗
T−1 must not be too small. This is only possible if the belief in period
T − 1 is already large enough: pe
T−1 ≥ 1
φ2. Exactly the same arguments apply for
the preceding periods such that we can calculate the minimally necessary belief for
each period T − j for all j ≤ s: pmin
T−j = 1
φj+1. By deﬁnition the period T − s is the
last period in which the initial population fraction of honest borrowers is above the
minimal belief necessary for lenders to extend credit: 1
φs ≥ p ≥ 1
φs+1. It is therefore
in this period that borrowers start to partly default, such that the minimal belief can
be sustained in all subsequent periods. The equilibrium repayment probabilities of
borrowers in all periods t ≥ T−j for 0 <j≤ s stated in Proposition A2 are obtained








t+1,w h e r epe




In the early periods of the game t<T− s all borrowers repay with probability
γ∗
t = 1. Thus, competition drives repayment requests down to ˜ r∗
t = k∗
t.I np e r i o d
T −s the lenders’ belief may be strictly higher than the minimally necessary belief:
36p> 1
φs+1. Competition implies that also in this case the requested repayment is set




pφs .I n a l l
later periods T −s<t≤ T the lenders’ belief is always exactly at the threshold and
accordingly the zero-proﬁt condition can only be satisﬁed if the desired repayments
are set at the maximal possible level: ˜ r∗
t = φk∗
t. As each individual lender earns
zero-proﬁts in every period any credit size kt ∈ [0,1] is a best-response of a lender
to the equilibrium strategies of borrowers and other lenders in every period.
A.3 Lending with Relationship Banking
We now assume that borrowers have ﬁxed ID numbers so that lenders can identify those
borrowers whom they have traded with in the past.
A.3.1 Market without a Credit Registry
Proposition A3 shows that the possibility for relationship banking allows to sustain sub-
stantial credit volumes even in the case where there is no credit registry and the share of
honest borrowers would lead to a market collapse in a one-shot transaction. The intuition
behind this equilibrium is the following: In the ﬁrst period lenders compete for borrowers.
Those lenders who succeed in concluding a contract with a borrower in the ﬁrst period
subsequently establish a long-term relationship with this borrower by renewing the con-
tract in each period as long as the borrower has never defaulted. Outside lenders who
could not conclude a contract in the ﬁrst period do not try to enter the credit market in
later periods. The reason for this is their fear that oﬀering a contract would only attract
selﬁsh switchers with whom trading is not proﬁtable. As the incumbent lenders’ rela-
tionships are not contested from the outside, they can skim part of the gains from trade
and earn relational rents. As lenders anticipate the emergence of rents in relationships,
competition implies that they are prepared to take losses in the ﬁrst period in order to
get the possibility to start a relationship. The conditional contract renewals of incumbent
borrowers in combination with the fact the outside lenders are not willing to oﬀer credit
motivates selﬁsh sellers to perfectly imitate the repayment behavior of honest borrowers
in the early periods of the game. In order to maximize their rent lenders extend loans
of the maximal size in these periods. During this “pooling” phase of the experiment no
additional information about the types of borrowers is revealed and the lenders’ beliefs
remain constant at the initial level p. When the end of the game draws near, however,
lenders are only willing to renew their contracts if they get access to additional infor-
mation on the borrowers’ types. Consequently, selﬁsh borrowers start to default with a
positive probability. Lenders can update their beliefs at the beginning of every period
37and continue renewing their contracts. However, in this end-game periods lenders start
to lower the size of their loans such that the extended credit volume decreases towards
the end of the game.
Proposition A3: Consider a credit market game of T ≥ 2 periods and suppose that
1
φT <p< 1
φ. Without exogenous credit reporting the following strategies and beliefs form
a perfect bayesian equilibrium.
• In period 1 all lenders oﬀer the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]=
 ¯ k,max{0,¯ k − ρ}
 
to all borrow-
ers, where ρ =( T − s − 2+pφs)(φ − 1)¯ k.
• In all periods 2 ≤ t ≤ T all lenders who concluded a contract in the previous period
oﬀer the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t] to their incumbent borrower if this borrower repaid in the
previous period. If the incumbent borrower of a lender defaulted in the previous
period or if the lender didn’t conclude a contract in the previous period, the lender
does not oﬀer any credit at all. The credit size and the requested repayment in







 ¯ k,φ¯ k
 
if 2 ≤ t ≤ T − s   
φ
b




 l ¯ k
 
if t = T − s + l for all l ∈{ 1,2,...,s}
where s is the smallest integer that satisﬁes p ≥ 1
φs+1.
• Honest borrowers accept the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]i na l lp e r i o d st and repay the loan in
each period.
• Selﬁsh borrowers accept the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]i na l lp e r i o d st. Their repayment
probability γ∗




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i f t<T− s
(φs−1)p
1−p if t = T − s
φs−l−1
φs+1−l−1 if t = T − s + l for all l ∈{ 1,2,...,s − 1}
0i f t = T
• All lenders believe that any borrower who defaults on a loan in any period is
selﬁsh. Furthermore, outside lenders believe that borrowers who switch lenders
in any period t>1 are selﬁsh.
38Proof of Proposition A3: P r o o fi sb yc o n s t r u c t i o na n di se s t a b l i s h e di n4s t e p s :
Step 1 (repayment by honest borrowers): Honest borrowers will repay in each period
as long as their ﬁnancing conditions are fair; i.e. ˜ r∗
t ≤ φk∗
t. Given the strategies of
lenders this condition is satisﬁed in every period.
Step 2 (repayment by selﬁsh borrowers): The argumentation is very similar to the one
in Step 2 of the Proof of Proposition A2. In period T selﬁsh borrowers will always
default. The incentive constraint for selﬁsh borrowers in non-ﬁnal periods t<Tis
again :−rt + V R
t+1 ≥ V D
t+1. A selﬁsh borrower’s incentives in the next to last period
T − 1 are as follows: The lenders’ strategies above imply that V R






 s ¯ k = a +
φs¯ k
bs−1 and V D
T = a.A s˜ r∗
T−1 =
φs¯ k
bs−1 the incentive constraint is
met with equality in period T − 1. It is therefore a best strategy for the selﬁsh
borrower to repay with any probability γ∗
T−1 ∈ [0,1]. Similar to Step 2 of the Proof
of Proposition A2 the same argument can be made for all periods t ≥ T − s.I n
periods t<T− s all lenders oﬀer the contract [k∗
t, ˜ r∗
t]=




t = φ¯ k<b ¯ k the incentive constraint is met with inequality in these periods. It is
therefore a best strategy for selﬁsh borrowers to repay with probability γ∗
t =1i n
all periods t<T− s.
Step 3 (beliefs of lenders): In equilibrium all borrowers of the same type play identical
strategies. However, lenders only observe the repayment behavior of borrowers with
whom they directly interact. The lenders strategies imply that they either form a
bilateral relationship with a borrowers from period 1 on, or they do not enter the
credit market at all. At the beginning of each period all lenders who are part of
an ongoing relationship form a new belief about the honesty of their incumbent
borrower based on his repayment behavior in the last period. In equilibrium the
lenders’ contract oﬀers are such that honest borrowers always have an incentive to
repay. In periods t<T−s also selﬁsh borrowers repay with certainty in equilibrium.
As defaulting is oﬀ the equilibrium path in these periods, Bayes’ Rule does not apply
and it must be speciﬁed how lenders update their beliefs in case of default: We
assume that lenders have the out-of-equilibrium belief that any borrower without
a clean record is selﬁsh. In periods T − s ≤ t ≤ T only selﬁsh borrowers default
with a positive probability in equilibrium such that lenders rationally believe that
not repaying borrowers are selﬁsh. Bayesian updating implies that the belief about







t−1. Furthermore, we assume that lenders who are not in a relationship
with a borrower believe that borrowers who switch lenders are selﬁsh. In equilibrium
borrowers do not switch lenders such that this is an out-of-equilibrium belief.
39Step 4 (contracts of lenders): The derivation of the repayment behavior of the borrowers
in periods T −s ≤ t ≤ T and the best-response oﬀers of lenders in periods T −s<
t ≤ T is identical as in the Proof of Proposition A2 and therefore omitted here.
Since the end-game situation for lenders is identical as in Proposition A2 lenders
make zero proﬁts in all periods T − s<t≤ T. However, in periods 2 ≤ t ≤ T − s
those lenders who are in a relationship with a borrower earn rents. The reason
is that outside lenders have the out-of-equilibrium belief that switching borrowers
are selﬁsh and consequently do not make any credit oﬀers. In these periods all
borrowers repay with certainty and as lenders do not have to fear competition from
other lenders they extend the maximal credit volume k∗
t = ¯ k and ask for the highest
possible repayment ˜ r∗
t = φk∗
t.A sac o n s e q u e n c et h el e n d e r sm a k ep o s i t i v ep r o ﬁ t s .
In period 1 in contrast all lenders anticipate that only lenders who conclude a
contract in the ﬁrst period succeed in establishing a relationship. Thus, the excess
supply of lenders implies that lenders compete for borrowers in the ﬁrst period.
The rent from periods 2 ≤ t ≤ T − s for lenders who establish a relationship is
equal to ρ =( T −s−2+pφs)(φ−1)¯ k. Competition implies that lenders are willing
to make losses in the ﬁrst period as long as these losses are not larger than the rent




 ¯ k,max{0,¯ k − ρ}
 
.
A.3.2 Market with a Credit Registry
In the situation where both the credit registry and the opportunity for relationship
banking are present Proposition A2 and Proposition A3 are sustainable.
Note: Applicability of Propositions A2 and A3 to Experiment
In our experiment lenders could only choose credit sizes from the set {0,5,10,...,50}.
The limited number of possible credit sizes may render it impossible that lenders choose
the credit size such that borrowers are always indiﬀerent in the end-game. However,
alternatively we could also write down equilibria in which lenders do not lower the credit
size in the end-game but instead oﬀer the maximal credit only with a certain probability
to borrowers who have always repaid in the past (or a combination of randomization
and decreasing credit volumes). As probabilities can always be chosen continuously the
discrete set of repayments would no longer be a problem. However, as we believe that
the reduction of credit volumes is more realistic and the qualitative predictions of the
equilibria remain the same we decided to present these more intuitive equilibria.
40Experimental Instructions 
"Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment" 
by Martin Brown and Christian Zehnder 
The following instructions are a translation of our original German instructions for the F-CR
treatment. They include instructions and documentation sheets for lenders and entrepreneurs. 
The original instructions for all four treatments, as well as the z-tree codes are available (in 
German) from the authors. 
The instructions for the F-NO, R-CR, and R-NO treatments are exactly identical to those below 
except for the following changes:  
 In the instructions for the F-NO treatment all references to the "information centre" are 
omitted:  
o Part (4) of the "Overview of Experimental Procedures" (lenders and 
entrepreneurs) 
o Section (4) of the "Detailed Experimental Procedures" (lenders and entrepreneurs)  
o Section 1.11 of the lenders instructions.  
 The instructions for the R-CR and R-NO treatments correspond to those of the F-CR and 
F-NO respectively, except for the following change: All sections of the F- instructions where 
we mention that ID numbers are fixed for the whole duration of the experiment are changed, 
and explicitly state that ID numbers are randomly assigned in each period. This applies to the 
following sections: 
o Last paragraph of the cover page (lenders and entrepreneurs) 
o Section 1.4 (lenders and borrowers)  
o Section 4.2 in R-CR (lenders and borrowers): Here we state that the repayment 
history of an entrepreneur is reported under his current ID number.  
o The documentation sheet does not bear an ID number (lenders and borrowers) Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 2
Instructions for Lenders 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. Everything that you need to know to participate in this experiment is explained below. 
Should you have any difficulties in understanding these instructions, please notify us. We will 
answer your questions at your cubicle. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial sum of 10 Swiss Francs. During 
the course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points.  
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions which you 
will enter in a computer. There are 20 periods in all. The amount of points that you gain during 
each period depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. All points that you 
gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Swiss Francs at the end of the 
experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
20 Points = 1 Swiss Franc 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of money that you earned during the 
experiment in addition to your 10 Francs initial sum. 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. 
In addition we would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are 
required for the experiment. Communication between participants and unnecessary interference 
with computers will lead to exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we 
shall be glad to assist you. 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: lenders and entrepreneurs. 
There are 10 lenders and 7 entrepreneurs. You shall be a lender for the entire duration of the 
experiment.
All participants have received an identification number which they will keep for the entire 
duration of the experiment. Your identification number is stated on the documentation sheet in 
front of you. Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 3
Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
At the beginning of each period all lenders receive a capital endowment. A lender can use this 
capital in two ways. He can use the capital to earn a certain income. Alternatively, he can use it to 
extend credit to an entrepreneur. If an entrepreneur receives credit he earns an investment return. 
The entrepreneur then decides whether to make a repayment to the lender or not.  
The experiment last for a total of 20 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
1) Trading Phase: In each period there is a trading phase which lasts 2 minutes. During this 
phase the lenders can make credit offers, which can be accepted by the entrepreneurs. If you, as a 
lender, want to make a credit offer you must state the following:  
x The credit amount  
x The desired repayment  
x And finally, which entrepreneurs may accept the offer. 
As a lender you can make as many credit offers in each period as you want. A credit offer can be 
accept at any time during the trading phase. Each lender and each entrepreneur can only enter one 
credit agreement per period. As there are 10 lenders and 7 entrepreneurs, some lenders will not 
extend credit in any given period.  
2) Investment Return and Repayment: If an entrepreneur enters a credit agreement during the 
trading phase, the credit amount is automatically invested. Hereby, he earns an investment return 
which is double the size of his credit amount. Following this, the entrepreneur decides whether to 
make the desired repayment to the lender. He can decide to make the desired repayment or to 
make no repayment at all.
3) Income Calculation: As soon as all entrepreneurs have decided whether to make the 
repayment to their lender, all earnings have been determined. At the end of the experiment your 
income from all 20 periods will be summed up, exchanged into Swiss Francs and paid to you 
together with your initial sum of 10 Swiss Francs.  
4) Information Centre: At the end of each period the repayment decisions of all entrepreneurs 
are automatically saved in an "Information Centre". This information can be accessed by all 
lenders in all following periods free of charge and at any time.  Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 4
Detailed Experimental Procedures 
There are 10 lenders and 7 entrepreneurs in this experiment. You are an entrepreneur for the 
entire duration of the experiment. During the experiment you will enter your decisions in a 
computer. In the following we describe in detail how you can make your decisions in each 
period. 
1. The Trading Phase
(1.1) At the start of each period you as a lender receive a capital endowment of 50 Points. You 
can use this capital in two ways. You can use your capital to extend credit to entrepreneurs. 
Alternatively, you can use your capital to earn a certain income. You can freely decide which 
share of your capital to extend credit and which share to use to earn a certain income. 
(1.2) If you want to extend credit in a period you can make credit offers to the entrepreneurs. For 
this purpose, the following input screen will appear during the trading phase:  
(1.3) In the top left corner you see in which period of the experiment you are. In the top right 
corner you see the remaining time left in the trading phase (in seconds). Each trading phase lasts 
for 2 minutes (120 seconds) in each period. Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 5
(1.4) Directly underneath the time display you see your identification number. You keep this 
identification number for the entire duration of the experiment, i.e. for all 20 periods. This
also applies for all other participants in the experiment, i.e. all lenders and entrepreneurs have a 
constant identification number for all 20 periods.  
(1.5) Once you see the above screen, a trading phase commences As a lender you now have the 
opportunity to make credit offers to the entrepreneurs. In order to do so you must enter the 
following items on the right side of your screen: 
 Type of credit offer (public or private) 
 Credit Amount 
 Desired Repayment 
 Which entrepreneurs may accept the offer.  
(1.6) First you must decide whether you want to make a public or private credit offer:  
Private credit offers 
Private credit offers are addressed to one entrepreneur only. Only this entrepreneur is informed 
about the offer and only this entrepreneur can accept the offer. No other lender or entrepreneur 
is informed about this offer. If you want to make a private offer, click on the field "private". 
Afterwards click on the field of the entrepreneur, to whom you want to address the offer. 
Public credit offers 
In contrast to private offers, all participants in the experiment are informed about each 
public offer. All entrepreneurs and lenders see all public offers on their screens. A public 
offer can, however, only be accepted by those entrepreneurs to whom you address it. You can 
address a public offer to more than one entrepreneur at the same time. If you want to make a 
public offer, click on the field "public". Afterwards click on the fields of those entrepreneur, to 
whom you want to address the offer. If you want to address a public offer to all entrepreneurs, 
click on the field "all". 
(1.7) Once you have determined which entrepreneurs may accept the offer, you must determine 
the credit amount. You enter this in the field "credit amount". The credit amount may not be 
lower than 0 and may not exceed your capital of 50. Moreover, the credit amount must be a 
multiple of 5. 
0 < Credit Amount d 50 
(1.8) Finally, you must determine which repayment you desire. You enter this in the field 
"desired repayment". The desired repayment may not be lower than 0 and may not exceed 100. 
The desired repayment must also be a multiple of 5. 
0 < Desired Repayment d 100 Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 6
(1.9) After you have fully determined your credit offer, you must click on the "ok" button to 
submit the offer. As long as you have not clicked on "ok" you may revise your offer.  
(1.10) As a lender you are not obliged to make a credit offer. If you do not want to make any 
credit offer in a period you can click on the button "no offer" in that period. 
(1.11) At the beginning of each trading phase you as a lender are informed about the prior  
repayment decisions of entrepreneurs. The information centre compiles a table with an entry for 
each entrepreneur and each prior period: If an entrepreneur accepted a credit offer and made the 
desired repayment, an "O" is entered in the table corresponding cell. If an entrepreneur accepted a 
credit offer and did not make the desired repayment, an "X" is entered in the corresponding cell. 
If an entrepreneur did not accept enter a credit agreement in a period a "" is entered in the 
corresponding cell. At the beginning of each trading phase the "information center" is displayed 
automatically for 30 seconds. During a trading phase you can also access the information centre, 
any time, by clicking the button "information centre". 
(1.12) On the left side of your screen you see the title "public credit offers". All public credit 
offers of the current trading phase are displayed here. Your public offers as well as those of all 
other lenders are displayed. You can see which lender made each offer, which credit amount is 
offered and which repayment is desired.  
(1.13) All private credit offers which you have made in the current trading phase are displayed In 
the middle of your screen under the title "your private credit offers". You can see to which 
entrepreneur you addressed each offer, which credit amount you offered, and which repayment 
you desired. 
(1.14) Each lender can make as many private and public offers as he wishes in each period.
Each offer made by you can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
(1.15) Each lender can enter only one credit agreement in each period. Once one of your 
offers has been accepted you will be notified about which entrepreneur accepted which offer. On 
the bottom of your screen you will see the number of the entrepreneur who accepted the offer, 
your offered credit amount, and your desired repayment. As you can enter only one trade 
agreement in each period, all your other offers will be automatically cancelled. Moreover, you 
will not be able to make any further offers 
(1.11) Each entrepreneur can enter only one credit agreement per period. Once all 
entrepreneurs have entered a credit agreement, or the remaining lenders do not want to make any 
credit offers, or the time has elapsed, a trading phase is concluded. Following this, no more credit 
offers can be made or accepted in this period.  
2. Investment Return and Actual Repayment
(2.1) If an entrepreneur enters a credit agreement, he earns an investment return. The investment 
return of the entrepreneur is always double the amount of the credit he accepted:  Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 7
Investment Return of the Entrepreneur = 2 x Credit Amount 
(2.2) All entrepreneurs who enter a credit agreement must decide whether to make the desired 
repayment. The repayment desired by you is not binding for your entrepreneur. Your 
entrepreneur can choose to make your desired repayment, or he can decide to make no 
repayment.  
(2.3) While your entrepreneur chooses his actual repayment, we ask you to enter on a separate 
screen your estimation of the chance that your desired repayment will be made. 
3. Income Calculation
(3.1) Your income as a lender is composed of your certain income and your credit-income. Your 
certain income equals the share of your capital, which you did not extend as credit. If you did 
not enter a credit agreement in a period, you earn a certain income of 50 points in that period. 
Your Certain Income = 50 – Credit Amount  
(3.2) If you entered a credit agreement, your credit income is equal to the actual repayment of 
the entrepreneur. This actual repayment can either be your desired repayment or 0.  
Your Credit Income = Actual Repayment 
(3.3) Your total income in a period is the sum of your certain income and your credit income. 
Your total income depends therefore on the credit amount you agreed upon and the actual 
repayment of the entrepreneur.  
Your Income = 50 – Credit Amount + Actual Repayment 
(3.4) If an entrepreneur entered a credit agreement, he earns an investment return which is double 
the size of his credit amount. His income thus rises with the amount of credit agreed upon. The 
income of the entrepreneur declines, however, with his actual repayment to the lender.  
Income of Entrepreneur = 10 + 2 x Credit Amount – Actual Repayment 
If, in any period, an entrepreneur does not enter a credit agreement, he earns an income of 10 
points in that period.  
(3.5) The income of all lenders and entrepreneurs are determined in the same way. Each lender 
can therefore calculate the income of his entrepreneur and each entrepreneur can calculate the 
income of his lender.  
(3.6) You will be informed about your income and the income of your entrepreneur on an 
"income screen" (see below). After you have studied the income screen, please note all Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 8
information on your documentation sheet. The documentation sheet serves the purpose of 
informing you about all your prior credit agreements and your earned income. Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 9
4. Information Centre
(4.1) At the end of each period the repayment decision of all entrepreneurs will be automatically 
saved in the "information centre" The information centre compiles a table with an entry for each 
entrepreneur and each prior period: 
x If an entrepreneur accepted a credit offer and made the desired repayment, an "O" is 
entered in the table of the information centre.  
x If an entrepreneur accepted a credit offer and did not make the desired repayment, an "X" 
is entered in the table of the information centre.  
x If an entrepreneur did not enter a credit agreement in a period a "" is entered in the table 
of the information centre for that period.  
(4.2) At the beginning of each trading phase, the information centre shown below is displayed to 
all lenders. Here, all prior repayment decisions are displayed for each entrepreneur 
underneath his ID number, i.e. his personal repayment history is displayed for all prior 
periods. During a trading phase all lenders can access the information centre at any time. The 
information from the information centre is free of charge for all lenders.  
(4.3) The experiment will not commence, until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises below Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 10
(4.4) In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get accustomed to 
the computer. In these trial periods no repayment decisions will be made. These trial periods will 
not be added to the result of the experiment and therefore not remunerated. Following the trial 
periods we will begin the experiment which will last for 20 periods. 
Exercises
Please solve the following exercises, showing your corresponding calculations. If you have 
questions, please contact us. Wrong answers have no consequences for you.  
Exercise 1 
In a trading phase you did not make any credit offer. How high is your income in that period?  
Your Certain Income =  
Your Credit Income =  
Your Total Income =  
Exercise 2:
You made a public credit offer with a credit amount of 40 and a desired repayment of 50. Your 
entrepreneur made the desired repayment of 50. 
Your Certain Income =  
Your Credit Income =  
Your Total Income =  
       Income  of  Entrepreneur  =   
Exercise 3:
You made a public credit offer with a credit amount of 40 and a desired repayment of 50. Your 
entrepreneur made no repayment. 
Your Certain Income =  
Your Credit Income =  
Your Total Income =  
       Income  of  Entrepreneur  =   Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 11
Exercise 4:
You made a private credit offer with a credit amount of 20 and a desired repayment of 35. Your 
entrepreneur made the desired repayment of 35. 
Your Certain Income =  
Your Credit Income =  
Your Total Income =  
       Income  of  Entrepreneur  =   
Exercise 5:
You made a private credit offer with a credit amount of 20 and a desired repayment of 35. Your 
entrepreneur made no repayment. 
Your Certain Income =  
Your Credit Income =  
Your Total Income =  
       Income  of  Entrepreneur  =   
Exercise 6:
An entrepreneur did not accept any credit offer during a trading phase. How high is his income in 
that period? 
       Income  of  Entrepreneur  =   
Exercise 7:
You made several credit offers during a trading phase. None of these offers was accepted by an 
entrepreneur. How high is your income in that period? 
Your Certain Income =  
Your Credit Income =  
Your Total Income =  
Once you have solved all exercises, we recommend that you review them and your answers. 
After that, please consider which decisions you intend to make during the experiment.  Experiment V   Instructions for Lenders  Page 12
Documentation Sheet - Lenders 
This documentation sheet is for your own orientation. In each period please fill out the 
corresponding row. 
Period ID-Nr. of your 
Entrepreneur




Your Income     
(in points)  
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
8        
9        
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
17         
18         
19         
20         Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 13
Instructions for Entrepreneurs 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. Everything that you need to know to participate in this experiment is explained below. 
Should you have any difficulties in understanding these instructions please notify us. We will 
answer your questions at your cubicle. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial sum of 10 Swiss Francs. During 
the course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points.  
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions which you 
will enter in a computer. There are 20 periods in all. The amount of points that you gain during 
each period depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. All points that you 
gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Swiss Francs at the end of the 
experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
20 Points = 1 Swiss Franc 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of money that you earned during the 
experiment in addition to your 10 Francs initial sum. 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. 
In addition we would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are 
required for the experiment. Communication between participants and unnecessary interference 
with computers will lead to exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we 
shall be glad to assist you. 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: lenders and entrepreneurs. 
There are 10 lenders and 7 entrepreneurs. You shall be an entrepreneur for the entire duration 
of the experiment. 
All participants have received an identification number which they will keep for the entire 
experiment. Your identification number is stated on the documentation sheet in front of you. Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 14
Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
At the beginning of each period all lenders receive a capital endowment. A lender can use this 
capital in two ways. He can use the capital to earn a certain income. Alternatively, he can use 
it to extend credit to an entrepreneur. If an entrepreneur receives credit he earns an investment 
return. The entrepreneur then decides whether to make a repayment to the lender or not.
The experiment lasts for a total of 20 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
1) Trading Phase: In each period there is a trading phase which lasts 2 minutes. During this 
phase the lenders can make credit offers, which can be accepted by the entrepreneurs. When 
making a credit offer a lender must state the following:
x The credit amount  
x The desired repayment  
x And finally, which entrepreneurs may accept the offer. 
In any period each lender can make as many credit offers as he wants. You as an entrepreneur 
can accept any offer addressed to you at any time during the trading phase. Each lender and 
each entrepreneur can only enter one credit agreement per period. As there are 10 lenders and 
7 entrepreneurs, some lenders will not extend credit in any given period.
2) Investment Return and Repayment: If you as an entrepreneur enter a credit agreement 
during the trading phase, the credit amount is automatically invested. Hereby, you earn an 
investment return which is double the size of your credit amount. Following this, you decide 
as whether to make the desired repayment to the lender. You can decide to make the desired 
repayment or to make no repayment at all.
3) Income Calculation: As soon as all entrepreneurs have decided whether to make the 
repayment to their lender, all earnings have been determined. At the end of the experiment 
your income from all 20 periods will be summed up, exchanged into Swiss Francs and paid to 
you together with your initial sum of 10 Swiss Francs.
4) Information Centre: At the end of each period the repayment decisions of all 
entrepreneurs are automatically saved in an "Information Centre". This information can be 
accessed by all lenders in all following periods free of charge and at any time.  Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 15
Detailed Experimental Procedures  
There are 10 lenders and 7 entrepreneurs in this experiment. You are an entrepreneur for 
the entire duration of the experiment. During the experiment you will enter your decisions 
in a computer. In the following we describe in detail how you can make your decisions in 
each period. 
1. The Trading Phase
(1.1) At the start of each period all lenders receive a capital endowment of 50 Points. They 
can use this capital to extend credit to entrepreneurs. Alternatively, they can use their capital 
to earn a certain income.  
(1.2) If a lender wants to extend credit he can make credit offers to the entrepreneurs during 
the trading phase. As an entrepreneur you can accept one of the credit offers addressed to you 
during the trading phase. For this purpose, the following input screen will appear during each 
trading phase:  
(1.3) In the top left corner you see in which period of the experiment you are. In the top right 
corner you see the remaining time left in the trading phase (in seconds). Each trading phase 
lasts for 2 minutes (120 seconds) in each period. 
(1.4) Directly underneath the time display you see your identification number. You keep this 
identification number for the entire duration of the experiment, i.e. for all 20 periods. Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 16
This also applies for all other participants in the experiment, i.e. all lenders and entrepreneurs 
have a constant identification number for all 20 periods.
(1.5) Once you see the above screen, a trading phase commences As an entrepreneur you can 
now accept credit offers which have been addressed to you by lenders. There are two types of 
credit offers which you can accept:
Private credit offers to you 
Each lender can offer private credit offers to you. Only you are informed about this offer 
and only you can accept this offer. No other lender or entrepreneur is informed about this 
offer. Should you receive a private credit offer, it will appear on the left side of the screen, 
under the title "Private offers to you". Each private offer contains the identification number 
of the lender who made the offer, the credit amount offered, and the repayment desired by 
the lender. 
Public credit offers 
Each lender can also make public credit offers. In contrast to private offers, all participants 
in the experiment ( i.e. all lenders and all entrepreneurs) are informed about each public 
offer. The lender can further decide which entrepreneurs can accept a public offer. A 
public offer can be addressed to more than one entrepreneur at the same time. If a lender 
makes a public credit offer, it will be displayed on the right side of your screen, under the 
title "Public Offers". A public credit offer again contains the identification number of the 
lender who made the offer, the credit amount offered, and the repayment desired by the 
lender. If the lender decided that you may accept the offer, an „O“ will displayed next to 
the offer. If the lender decided that you may not accept the offer, an „X“ will displayed 
next to the offer.
If you want to accept a credit offer, please click first on the row in which the offer is 
displayed. When you do this, the offer will be highlighted. If you are sure you want to accept 
the offer, click then on the button "accept" which is situated towards the bottom of the screen. 
As long as you have not clicked "accept" you can alter your choice. 
(1.6) Each entrepreneur can enter only one credit agreement per period. Once you have 
accepted one credit offer, you cannot accept any further offers. As soon as you have clicked 
on the "accept" button the offer you have accepted will be displayed in the bottom row of 
your screen. 
(1.7) All lenders have to observe the same rules when making credit offers. The credit 
amount may not be lower than 0 and may not exceed their capital of 50.  The desired
repayment may not be lower than 0 and may not exceed 100. Moreover, the credit amount 
and the desired repayment must be a multiple of 5. 
0 < Credit Amount d 50 
0 < Desired Repayment d 100 
(1.8) Each lender can make as many private and public offers as he wishes in each 
period. Each offer that is made by a lender can be accepted at any time during the trading 
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(1.9) Each lender can enter only one credit agreement in each period. Once an offer of a 
lender has been accepted he will be notified about which entrepreneur accepted it. As each 
lender can enter only one trade agreement in each period all other offers of the lender will be 
automatically cancelled. Moreover, he will not be able to make any further offers 
(1.10) No lender is obliged to make a credit offer. For this purpose, a lender can click on the 
button "no offer" in any period. As an entrepreneur you are also not obliged to accept a credit 
offer. 
(1.11) Once the time has elapsed, all entrepreneurs have entered a credit agreement, or the 
remaining lenders do not want to make any credit offers, a trading phase is concluded. 
Following this, no more credit offers can be made or accepted in this period.
2. Investment Return and Actual Repayment
(2.1) If you, as an entrepreneur, have accepted a credit offer, you earn an investment return. 
Your investment return is always double the amount of the credit you accepted:
Your Investment Return = 2 x Credit Amount 
(2.2) Following this you must decide whether to make the desired repayment. The repayment 
desired by your lender is not binding for you as an entrepreneur. You can choose the 
desired repayment of your lender. You can, however, also to decide to make no repayment. If 
you have entered a credit agreement during a trading phase, the following input screen will 
appear for you to make your repayment decision: Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 18
(2.3) In order to choose the desired repayment of your lender, click on the field "yes". If you 
choose to make no repayment, click on the field "no". As long as you have not pressed "ok" 
you can alter your choice. 
3. Income Calculation
(3.1) As soon as all entrepreneurs have decided whether to make the repayment to their 
lender, all earnings for this period have been determined. Your income as an entrepreneur 
depends on the amount of your agreed credit as well as on your repayment to the lender.  
(3.2) If you entered a credit agreement, your income depends on your investment return and 
your repayment decision. Your investment return is double the size of your agreed credit 
amount. Your income thus rises with the amount of credit accepted. Your income declines, 
however, with your actual repayment to the lender.  
Your Income = 10 + 2 x Credit Amount – Actual Repayment 
(3.3) If, in any period, you do not enter a credit agreement, you earn an income of 10 points in 
that period.
(3.4) If a lender does not enter a credit agreement in a period, he earns an income of 50 points 
in that period. If he does enter a credit agreement, his income rises with the actual repayment 
of the entrepreneur. 
Income of the Lender = 50 – Credit Amount + Actual Repayment 
(3.5) The income of all lenders and entrepreneurs are determined in the same way. Each 
lender can therefore calculate the income of his entrepreneur and each entrepreneur can 
calculate the income of his lender.
(3.6) Please note that entrepreneurs can incur losses in each period. Losses can, however, 
always be prevented through your own decisions. If you make a loss, you have to pay this 
from earnings in earlier periods or from your initial sum of money. 
(3.7) You will be informed about your income and the income of your lender on an "income 
screen" (see below). After you have studied the income screen please note all information on 
your documentation sheet. The documentation sheet serves the purpose of informing you 
about all your prior credit agreements and your earned income. Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 19Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 20
4. Information Centre
(4.1) At the end of each period your repayment decision and that of all other entrepreneurs 
will be automatically saved in the "information centre" The information centre compiles a 
table with an entry for each entrepreneur and each prior period: 
x If you as an entrepreneur accepted a credit offer and made the desired repayment, an 
"O" is entered in the table of the information centre.  
x If you accepted a credit offer and did not make the desired repayment, an "X" is 
entered in the table of the information centre.  
x If you did not enter a credit agreement in a period a "" is entered in the table of the 
information centre for that period.  
(4.2) At the beginning of each trading phase, the information centre shown below is displayed 
to all lenders. Here, all your prior repayment decisions are displayed underneath your ID 
number, i.e. your repayment history is displayed for all prior periods. During a trading 
phase all lenders can access the information centre at any time. The information from the 
information centre is free of charge for all lenders.  
(4.3) The experiment will not commence, until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises 
below 
(4.4) In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get accustomed 
to the computer. In these trial periods no repayment decisions will be made. These trial Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 21
periods will not be added to the result of the experiment and therefore not remunerated. 
Following the trial periods we will begin the experiment which will last for 20 periods. 
Exercises
Please solve the following exercises, showing your corresponding calculations. If you have 
questions, please contact us. Wrong answers have no consequences for you.  
Exercise 1 




You accepted a public credit offer with a credit amount of 40 and a desired repayment of 50. 
You make the desired repayment of 50. 
          Your Income =  
          Income of the Lender =  
Exercise 3:
You accepted a public credit offer with a credit amount of 40 and a desired repayment of 50. 
You make no repayment. 
          Your Income =  
          Income of the Lender =  Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 22
Exercise 4:
You accepted a private credit offer with a credit amount of 20 and a desired repayment of 35. 
You make the desired repayment of 35. 
          Your Income =  
          Income of the Lender =  
Exercise 5:
You accepted a private credit offer with a credit amount of 20 and a desired repayment of 35. 
You make no repayment. 
          Your Income =  
          Income of the Lender =  
Exercise 6:
A lender made several credit offers during a trading phase. None of these offers was accepted 
by an entrepreneur.  How high is the income of the lender in that period? 
Income of the Lender =  
Once you have solved all exercises, we recommend that you review them and your answers. 
After that, please consider which decisions you intend to make during the experiment.  Experiment V   Instructions for Entrepreneurs  Page 23
Documentation Sheet - Entrepreneurs 
This documentation sheet is for your own orientation. In each period please fill out the 
corresponding row. 
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